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 Coordinating density; working through conviction, suspicion and pragmatism.  
 
Achieving higher density development has become, as part of sustainable development, a core 
principle of the contemporary planning professional. The appeal of density is its simplicity, it is an 
independent measurable element to which various separate claims can be and are attached; it 
achieves greater public transport use, makes it possible to live nearer to work, supports mixed uses 
providing a more lively street-scene and so on. As the academic literature has shown the reality is 
much more complex as achieving a positive outcome through adjustments to density may lead to 
negative outcomes elsewhere; it can allow more people to live near public transport nodes but can be 
detrimental in terms of housing affordability for example. Given this tension between the simplicity 
of the claims and the complexity of application we are interested in how planners seek to balance the 
multiple advantages and disadvantages of density; to what extent do they approach density as a 
simple variable or as a complex act of balancing. We address this question by looking at four higher 
density developments in London. 
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Higher density development occupies a fascinating and enduring place in planning literature and 
planning practice. Our work was motivated by a simple question. In the context of multiple win-win 
claims for density to what extent do planners seek to balance the benefits and dis-benefits of higher 
density development in practice? One appeal of density is its apparent simplicity, it is offered as an 
independent variable (Boyko & Cooper 2011), which will deliver a series of benefits. In England, 
lower density development has been the tradition and so higher density living required a cultural 
shift on the part of developers (Karadimitriou 2013) and potential residents (Allen & Blandy 2004). 
Given this, the New Labour government of 1997-2010 drew heavily on what we categorise as a 
discourse of conviction to support this shift. Taken from the point of view of many practitioners, 
politicians and pressure groups, density serves as one of the most powerful tools to make cities 
more sustainable. Density is a simple yet effective measure that brings together economic, 
environmental and social benefits solving the problems of a sprawling society that has become 
disconnected, disengaged and distant from an earlier ideal of urban propinquity. But this simple win-
win characterisation hides great complexity. There are competing claims relating to density which 
we define here as discourses of suspicion and pragmatism. From the perspective of more pro-market 
urban economists, the push for density symbolises all that is wrong with land-use planning and its 
anti-market ideals. This body of criticism we identify as a discourse of suspicion, which sees density 
in a far more critical light and renders it problematic through a more fundamental questioning of the 
right or wisdom of state intervention in the market and of land-use planning in particular. From this 
perspective, density is simply one more example of a misguided attempt to intervene in the market. 
In contrast to the binary positions of discourses of conviction and suspicion, there is a large body of 
scholarly work that sees density as a policy objective in need of careful empirical evaluation. This 
debate attempts to understand what we may be likely to achieve is a policy of higher density is to be 
followed. It is less concerned with principled claims for or against higher density and is, instead, 
more focused on the practicality of implementation. Our paper asks how planners relate to these 
three perspectives. We evaluate the discourses of conviction, suspicion and pragmatism against the 
everyday practice of local planners when they make policy and determine applications. To elaborate 
on our initial question, we ask about the extent to which local planners assume that win-win 
outcomes will flow from higher density, as implicit in policy passed down through a hierarchical 
planning system. And about the extent to which local planners engage with discourses of 
pragmatism or even of suspicion.  
Our paper proceeds, in section two, with a literature review that fully outlines three discourses on 
planning for density. Next, in section three, we examine how national policy has addressed density 
in the UK and in particular England, thus providing ourselves with a temporal and institutional 
context in which to interpret the actions of contemporary local planners. The UK, England in 
particular, has a history of suburbanisation built at relatively low density, although, still at higher 
density than in other nations following this model such as the US, Canada and Australia. Planning’s 
modern day roots are largely to be found in solutions to nineteenth century industrialised cities such 
as London and Manchester. Early solutions included the Garden City which was not anti-urban in its 
philosophy but, as realised, proved to be the template for mass suburbanisation in the twentieth 
century. As such, UK planners are inheritors of a low-density tradition, which has only recently been 
challenged. Much of this challenge has come from outside the profession, notably through the 
millennial Urban Task Force (1999), subsequent legislation and central government planning policy 
guidance. While local planners may now be advocates of higher density development they are not its 
primary instigators as central, and in some cases regional, policy has set the agenda.  
Having set the context, in section four we next introduce our London case study, which looks at 
higher density development in two outer and two inner London authorities. After losing population 
over much of the twentieth century London has seen a marked reversal in its fortunes, inner London 
in particular has seen strong employment growth and a steady and sustained increase in its 
population, in no small part attributable to in-migration. There is a chronic problem of housing 
undersupply in England and this is particularly problematic in the economically ‘hot’ London and the 
southeast where a shortage of units and lack of affordability are both a growing cause for concern. 
Given long-term policies of urban containment in England, notably greenbelt policies, there is 
pressure in London to deliver a large number of units on a constrained number of sites; in the 
absence of a substantial increase in land supply the need to increase density is therefore evident. 
However, the turn to density is not sold as simple necessity, by those engaged in the discourse of 
conviction. Rather, it is held up as a highly desirable choice, bringing a series of social, environmental 
and economic benefits even where land supply is not so restricted.  
In the fifth section, using our three broad approaches to density, we turn to look at how planners 
approach and attempt to deliver the claimed benefits of higher density development. Do they simply 
assume that a series of gains will inevitably flow from density (the conviction approach)? Do they 
seek to develop techniques to balance the wins and losses of density (the pragmatic approach)? And 
to what extent do they question the fundamental claim that density and, by default, planning 
practice can deliver substantial gains in terms of sustainability (the suspicion approach)? In the sixth 
section we turn to the outcomes, looking first at how local planners evaluate developments against 
the claims for density.  
Finally, in concluding, we seek to draw some lessons for the future delivery of higher density 
development. Local planners operate within a highly constrained setting that threatens to make 
them mere transmitters rather than generators of discourses of density. However, local planners are 
reflexive and realistic in relation to density, they are not simple recipients of discourses of 
conviction. Planners increasingly have experience of higher density development and are reflecting 
on this. Yet, it is not evident how this knowledge is brought together horizontally between local 
planners (and others involved in local governance), or fed vertically to higher tier policy makers. We 
suggest a need to capture and direct experience at the local level more effectively.   
2. Background 
In this section we review the literature on density. As more extensive reviews exist elsewhere (Boyko 
& Cooper 2011), our purpose, here, is to categorise the literature within three broad positions on 
density that we have identified, conviction, suspicion and pragmatism. The purpose of this is to set 
out more clearly the interplay of influences in the debate and how this brings great complexity to 
the task of planning for higher density at the local level. There are many reasons why density has 
come to the fore and these also come to bear on local planning. Super density, stereotypically 
associated with the Asian city, is rapidly becoming a marker of modernity against the quaint and old 
bucolic visions of low-density suburbs. An increasing concern for the environment, a burgeoning 
world population and the emergence of the economic benefits of agglomeration all provide impetus 
for the case in favour of higher density.  
First a brief word on terminology and approach. We use the term compact city in this article, as it is 
in common usage in much of the literature to which we refer. In the UK, many of the ideas of the 
compact city have been promoted through urban renaissance. Because the compact city is a broadly 
defined set of ideals rather than a single outcome, and because the term is not used in everyday 
practice in the UK we have chosen in the title and in reporting our research to refer to higher density 
development. We are not seeking to reduce the compact city only to density, although it is an 
important part of it. Rather, we focus on the role of density in potentially delivering the broader 
suite of aims of the compact city. In the rest of this section, where we set out the literature review 
employing our three-way classification, we do not lend support to one position over another; rather, 
at this stage we are simply setting out to categorise the positions taken on density. 
2.1 Discourses of conviction 
‘Urbanologists’, can be seen to put forth discourses of conviction concerning the compact city with 
an almost “evangelical fervour” (Gleeson 2013: p1841). These discourses of conviction accompany 
the economic changes that have occurred over recent decades, which have led to a focus on the 
tendency to agglomeration and the economic value that this generates (Sassen 2001; Scott 2001). 
After an initial period of deindustrialisation in Anglo-American cities where a cycle of job and 
population losses made some question the future of cities, many have proven to be remarkably 
durable in a world of transient flows (Castells 2010). For Gleeson (2012), urbanologists can be 
identified by their “enthusiasm for physical density as a determining force (for good) in human 
relations” (p937). Examples of this are found in Glaeser (2011), “cities are expanding enormously 
because urban density provides the clearest path from poverty to prosperity” (p1), and Brugmann 
(2009), “without density of settlement, most of what we learn, produce, construct, organize, 
consume and provide as a service in the world would simply be too expensive” (p27). It is clear that 
these authors are axiomatically adopting a position that places density and good urban design at the 
heart of improving urban economic fortunes. 
International institutions have also joined the ‘new urban conversation’ and bought into the 
compact city project by promoting denser cities with more public transport as solutions to climate 
change (Gleeson 2013: p1841). UNEP’s Green Economy Report features a chapter named Cities, and 
one of its key messages announces that, “compact, relatively densely populated cities, with mixed-
use urban form, are more resource-efficient than any other settlement pattern with similar levels of 
economic output” (UNEP 2011: p458). Both the World Bank and the OECD have also recently 
released reports on Cities and Climate Change, both with very similar messages. Compact cities are a 
determining factor in producing more sustainable cities because they make more efficient use of 
public infrastructure, lead to less energy demand for transport and give better access to services 
(OECD 2010; World Bank 2010: p28). All three of these reports were released over a very short 
period suggesting the possibility of xx. The issue of cities and climate change has also been taken up 
by UN-Habitat in its global report, albeit with more care in its discussion of the evidence base (UN-
Habitat 2011). 
This normative voice surrounding density reflects both a long-term and shorter-term conventional 
wisdom about the city. Here, Jane Jacobs is the key figure writing in defence of a dense and mixed 
urban form, two key components of the compact city project (Jacobs 1961). This defence of vibrant 
inner-city blocks against the impetus to sprawl was rediscovered in the context of the process of 
legitimisation of the compact city. The characteristics she described have been reiterated decades 
later as a means to produce sustainable cities and improve quality of life (Rudlin and Falk 1999; 
Urban Task Force 1999). This urban design led discourse on the compact city is one of conviction in 
the sense that it relies on principles rather than empirically tested facts. As proposed by Jacobs and 
Appleyard, “After a while one knows and accepts that the research into what makes good places to 
live will be endless, often without conclusion, and always value-laden. There comes a time when one 
says, 'Well, I must take a leap. All of the experience has taught me something. It may be unprovable, 
but I think I know what a good place is’” (1987: p112). A similar argument, but with a different 
rationale, is made by Ellis (2002) who argues that as developers can build at lower density without 
evidence of its desirability urbanists should not wait for evidence to make the counter case (p283). 
Both these arguments question the absolute necessity of an evidence base in deciding on which type 
of urban forms should be sought. Through a tautological process, density takes on an institutional 
character for urbanists, it becomes a quality of professional belonging; to become an urbanist one 
has to appreciate the experience historic dense urban forms - Sienna, Manhattan, Paris - and, in 
having come to appreciate them, one is intuitively aware that dense urban form is good. This 
conventional wisdom is reinforced through institutional transmission. 
The promotion of the compact city as the sustainable urban form, and idealised through reference 
to the medieval walled city, has to be read as a not-so-veiled reaction to the dominant suburban 
character of the US and UK (Swenarton 2002). The new urbanism debate in the US and urban 
renaissance in the UK (which broadly converges with the compact city debate but does not use the 
term), are both informed by a longstanding professional critique of suburbanisation in these two 
nations. Many of the most vocal early critics of mass suburbanisation were architects (Nairn 1955) 
but some planners were too (Mumford 1968). This longstanding criticism is reflected in a 
contemporary variant of this discourse rooted in the urban design world. The principles of good 
urban design that Allan Jacobs and Appleyard (1987), and Ellis (2002), advocate are very similar to 
those of Jane Jacobs: minimum density levels, integration of activities, pedestrian public spaces and 
complexity of building types. However, Ellis is particularly overt in indicating how these ‘good’ 
principles are derived in no small part in reaction to ‘bad’ suburbanisation.  
One appeal of the compact city is its simplicity, that it can apparently provide solutions to a range of 
problems. The compact city, like community or sustainability, has a motherhood and apple pie 
quality to it; it is an unquestionable good. But discourses of conviction are highly selective in their 
idealisation of the compact city and are often marked by a distinctly a-political character. Low 
density London is compared unfavourably with high density Paris (Weaver 2003), yet while the petit 
bourgeois suburbs of London are viewed as a failure of English urbanism the suburbs of Paris, the 
banlieue, with all their social injustice are – along with France’s extensive urban sprawl -simply not 
mentioned. The selective nature of the discourse of conviction sometimes fails, or chooses to ignore 
the complexities and challenges of density. However, oppositional voices and voices of caution are 
found in discourses of suspicion and pragmatism. 
2.2 Discourses of suspicion 
Some discourses of suspicion are driven by dogma in the same way as discourses of conviction. The 
latter can overplay the role of the built form by claiming unproven or doubtful causative links 
between the built form and social benefits (such as sociability or equality) or behaviour (including 
delivering on more environmentally sustainable lifestyles). Meanwhile, some in the suspicion camp 
underplay the politics of the built form as the exercise of market choice can be more apparent than 
real. The suburbs, for example, where not simply the result of market choices by consumers, the 
conditions for their existence were often facilitated and/or underwritten by the state (Beauregard 
2006). As well as the ideological drivers of ‘free choice’ described by Beauregard, consumers are 
unlikely to request housing products that they can’t imagine. This has a self-reinforcing aspect to it, 
as when developers ask what sort of housing consumers want, consumers are likely only to make a 
choice from known products – reinforcing a certain conservatism on the part of developers 
(Karadimitriou 2013). Therefore, while discourses of conviction can overstate the benefits of density 
by focusing on gains while underestimating the costs of density, discourses of suspicion can 
sometimes overplay ‘choice’ where there is likely to be imperfect knowledge on the part of the 
consumer. This over claiming for ‘choice’ is reflected in the two broad strands of discourses of 
suspicion. One is rooted in principled objections to state intervention that seeks to guide people’s 
housing choices away from suburban developments toward more dense urban forms. The second 
highlights the unintended but often socially regressive consequences of restricting land supply and 
enforcing higher density cities. A staunch ‘principle’ opponent of policy led density and of planning 
more generally is O’Toole (2000) who frames his critique in terms of arguments for small 
government:  
When smart-growth planners say they want to give people choices, they mean they 
want to take choices away. When they say they want to relieve congestion, they mean 
they want to increase congestion so that people will be forced to ride mass transit. 
When they say they want affordable housing, they mean they want to make single 
family housing unaffordable so that all but the wealthiest people will live in high density 
housing. When they say they want to preserve open space for people, they mean they 
want to preserve it from people. (O’Toole 2001: p8) 
O’Toole’s attack on smart growth1 is centred on the right of individuals to make their own choices in 
the face of planning regulations (O’Toole 2001). As such it is not so much a criticism of the compact 
city project per se but rather a defence of the right to sprawl. For pro-market critics, the planned 
compact city contravenes individual desires, which people should be free to act on in a market 
                                                          
1 In simple terms a US variant of the compact city. 
driven society. Suburbanisation is simply a reflection of rising wealth, people will buy internal space 
and other benefits linked to housing such as garden space when they can afford to. These are going 
to be more affordable in the suburbs and as market actors, people should be able to choose to 
accept the time and financial costs of commuting, offsetting these against the benefit of lower 
density suburbia (Bruegmann 2005; Cheshire 2013; Howley 2009). In their study of 108 households 
moving houses in Cardiff, Senior et al. (2004) found that, “majority residential preferences are 
substantially out of alignment with the policies promoted by those preaching the virtues of an urban 
renaissance. Most households do not wish to live at higher densities, with less garden and parking 
space per dwelling, on brownfield land in inner-urban and city centre locations” (p354).  
This argument of choice and consumer demand links well with the ideas put forward by Audirac, 
Shermyen and Smith (1990) regarding the extent to which planning is able to stand in the way of 
strong market forces in any but the most restrictive of societies. They highlight that compact city 
policies ignore residents’ willingness to adopt and to pay for these measures and warn that the fact 
that these policies are advocated as ‘taxless’ solutions for urban sustainability may undermine 
support for stricter environmental policies. Similarly, Gordon and Richardson (1997) are also strong 
opponents of planning measures inspired by the compact city project on the similar grounds that 
they are in opposition to a preference for low-density development. Their engagement with the 
compact city project has led them to conclude that it is fundamentally flawed: “attempting a 
reversal of existing urban development trends is neither feasible nor desirable” (p103). For Neuman 
(2005) the compact city project can be criticised for obscuring those relations that are most 
important to achieving urban sustainability: “The attempt to attain sustainability via physical means 
alone is nonsensical” (p23). Similarly, Goodchild (1994: p153) argues that we cannot determine 
behaviour through planning alone. We cannot assume that the compact city will save energy on 
transport because we can’t predict human behaviour that well. This is also the essence of Gleeson’s 
(2012b) challenge to the compact city project: “It is not the work of planning to reshape the deep 
political economic structures driving human society to the precipice of climate default. A different 
rationale beckons that leads back to the origins of planning purpose. Adaptation is surely the new 
watchword for planning” (Gleeson 2012b: p253). For Gleeson, the compact city project falls prey to 
ecological fallacy, environmental determinism and spatial fetishism (Gleeson 2012b: p249) and 
planning should focus on the resilient city agenda.  
A variant of this argument is that the market is a better mechanism for changing behaviour. For 
Cheshire (2013) the more honest and effective answer would be to capture the full cost of using 
fossil fuels through taxation, moderating behaviour through price signals, rather than seeking to 
influence behaviour through the built environment. He argues that using the built environment to 
moderate behaviour is problematic, first because it takes a long time to achieve and, second, 
because we simply do not understand the city or human behaviour sufficiently to predict which 
particular built form will lead to a desired behaviour. In this context, Cheshire (2006) warns of the 
dangers of advocating policies, such as containment and densification, without the clear evidence 
base needed: “we are arguing that there is no adequate evidence for believing that they are right or 
will improve cities, either as places in which to live or as centres of economic activity” (p1243); in 
essence, this is the counter-case to Jacobs and Appleyard’s (2007) appeal to experience in deciding 
better urban forms. Clark (2005) also sees issues with the assumptions regarding individual 
behaviour made by proponents of the compact city, highlighting that the circumvention of compact 
city inspired regulations by the wealthy could lead to even more detrimental outcomes. Finally, from 
an Australian perspective, Forster (2006) argues that, “metropolitan planning strategies suggest an 
inﬂexible, over-neat vision for the future that, however well-intended, sits dangerously at odds with 
the picture of increasing geographical complexity that emerges clearly from recent research on the 
changing internal structure of Australian cities since the early 1990s” (Forster 2006: p180).  
Finally, some authors point out that the political instrumentalisation of the compact city project is a 
very real possibility. This is the suspicion that the notion of the compact city can be used as a cover 
to push forward policies and interventions that have goals other than environmental and social 
sustainability. Searle and Filion (2011), for example, raise the issue of the political use of the 
compact city project. Through their case studies of Toronto and Sydney they highlighted how the 
compact city was justified with differing emphases as the situation changed: “in periods of housing 
value inflation, intensification is presented as an instrument of residential affordability. When public-
sector budgets are especially tight, it becomes a means of reducing expenditures on infrastructure. 
Lately, emphasis has centred on the environmental, health and other quality of life benefits 
associated with the reduced reliance on the automobile afforded by intensification” (Searle and 
Filion 2011: p1429). This is reflected in the attitudes of political parties in power towards 
intensification: in New South Wales, “the more conservative Liberal Party emphasised public 
expenditure savings associated with intensification, whereas the Labour Party also underscored its 
environmental benefits” (Searle and Filion 2011: p1430). The fact the compact city project can fit 
these very different political agendas raises the possibility that it could be used instrumentally – as 
just another justification for a desired course of action - with potential distributional consequences.  
This same instrumentalisation of the compact city project can be seen in the critical analysis of the 
attempts to intensify the Poblenou district of Barcelona by Charnock and Ribera-Fumaz (2011). For 
them, the increases in density and emphases on mixed-use are meant to, “intensify the 
competitiveness of the district; first, as a place of economic innovation and transformation and, 
second, as a place of a vibrant popular culture based on the civic cultural tradition of Poblenou, and 
further strengthened by the bohemian milieu of various artists' studios, small creative companies, 
and communities resident in the district since the 1980s” (p625). As such, they see the compact city 
project as merely the latest label under which to further the quest for urban competiveness – a 
consideration far from the original aims of the compact city (Charnock and Ribera-Fumaz 2011). 
Sorensen et al. (2010) give us another example of the political instrumentalisation of the compact 
city project. In an economically stagnant Tokyo, there were, “powerful incentives for the central 
government to promote renewed profitability in the land development sector, a major method of 
which has been regulatory changes designed to promote intensification in central Tokyo, that have 
been promoted as ‘compact city’, ‘urban revitalisation’ and ‘urban renaissance’ strategies” (p560). 
This has been done through the transfer of planning powers from local to the central state, which, 
“served to undermine local democratic input into urban governance, to shift the balance of power in 
favour of asset accumulation and against liveability, and to increase conflict over urban 
intensification” (Sorensen et al. 2010: p580). Here, the compact city project is used as a means to 
legitimise the transfer of powers over planning from one scale to another and to justify the 
precedence accorded to exchange values over use values. Lees (2008) also warns us about the latent 
state-led gentrification agenda contained in UK policies that broadly draw on the compact city 
project: “it is ironic that a process that results in segregation and polarisation—gentriﬁcation—is 
being promoted via social mix policies as the ‘positive’ solution to segregation” (p2463). 
In summary, for those engaging in a discourse of suspicion, the attempt to plan cities is problematic 
for three, related, reasons. First, these authors raise principled objections to state intervention in 
market choices. For, Troy (1996), the issue with the compact city project, in this case the Australian 
variant of urban consolidation, is that it attacks the egalitarianism he sees as an inherent 
characteristic of suburban development. Urban consolidation, he argues, justified by discourses of 
sustainability and global competition, has led to an undermining of the social equity agenda and thus 
had a disproportionate effect on those most vulnerable (Troy 1996). A second related point is the 
danger of state failure. There will be indirect unintended outcomes where the policy focus is on the 
environment, there may be detrimental social and economic effects that are not properly costed. 
The compact city project has no regard for the larger dynamics at work in the city, reducing cities to 
mere sites (Vallance and Perkins 2010). Third, is the various ways in which the state and market 
deploy the case for the compact city, which suggests that it is being used to meet varied agendas 
which are given justification by claims to sustainability. Among these are attempts to align the 
notion of the compact city with party ideologies, its deployment to support urban competitiveness 
and the way it is used to provide a more profitable environment for developers.  
2.3 Discourses of pragmatism 
In contrast to the discourses of conviction and suspicion presented above, the majority of scholarly 
work on the compact city is embedded in a discourse of empirical evaluation. Here, the compact city 
is consciously taken as a policy objective that is open to empirical evaluation, with research aiming 
to allow for empirically supported conviction or suspicion. Like discourses of suspicion, discourses of 
pragmatism can similarly question the extent to which density will be able to achieve the claims 
made for it, however, pragmatists are more likely to seek to suggest means towards the ends rather 
than questioning the ends in the same way as discourses of suspicion.  
For some pragmatists the compact city project may be theoretically justifiable, but they find 
common ground with the discourse of suspicion in believing this does not mean that it can 
necessarily deliver these benefits: “the desire for the big idea has returned. However, the world is 
now more complex and political than it was when Howard, Wright and Le Corbusier were in full flow. 
Even if sustainability gives us a motive for the big idea, that idea necessarily has to be tempered by a 
dose of realism” (Breheny 1996: p32). Breheny advocates a middle ground between what he calls 
the extreme centrist (smart growth) and extreme decentrist positions (free marketeers and those 
who advocate a return to rural values); in doing so, he is questioning the ability to deliver the claims 
for the compact city project as presented by those he labels the extreme centrists (Breheny 1996).  
Most research within this category follows a similar format, which can be best grasped by focusing 
only on the ‘density’ aspect of the compact city. Churchman (1999) and Boyko and Cooper (2011) 
offer two broad reviews of the literature (the latter of 75 different studies) focused on the attempts 
to arrive at some conclusion about the effects of increasing densities in cities. And this focus on 
empirically evaluating the compact city is far from over. Dempsey and Jenks (2010) make the case 
for continued research on the compact city, highlighting many of the same themes that have been 
reviewed in the two articles above: “Is the compact city a physically and mentally healthy city?”, “Is 
the compact city a green city?”, “Is the compact city a safe city in terms of dealing with natural 
disaster, man-made disaster and providing residents with safe physical and social environments?”, 
“Is it the compact city or a city of compact neighbourhoods?” and “Does the compact city actually 
exist?“ (Dempsey & Jenks 2010: p120). As the final question is concerned with the linkages between 
the theory and the real world, the authors’ contribution serves as an impetus to continue with this 
discourse of empirical evaluation. As they note, “a wide range of urban forms and scales, for which 
the compact city has often been mooted as an appropriate model to achieve a more sustainable 
urban form, require more empirical scrutiny and examination” (Dempsey & Jenks 2010: p120). The 
compact city ideal is, therefore, to be tested through empirical investigation. And, importantly, this 
empirical investigation must grapple with the many trade-offs inherent in projects inspired by 
compact city principles that discourses of conviction ignore. 
2.3.1Trade-offs between the environmental and other dimensions 
A first set of distributional consequences can be found in work that seeks to test the effectiveness of 
the compact city project in more than the environmental dimension alone. It is important here to 
acknowledge that there are important methodological difficulties in assessing trade-offs of this kind. 
Indeed, only a comparison of the effects of a strategy of densification versus those of a strategy of 
limiting density within the same urban system can provide unequivocal evidence of the existence of 
trade-offs. Faced with this difficulty, the studies discussed in this section have pursued two different 
strategies to estimate possible trade-offs between the environmental and other dimensions. The 
first strategy is to build on observations made across neighbourhoods of different density levels 
within the same urban system. For example, Dave (2010), in his study of eleven neighbourhoods in 
metropolitan Mumbai, finds that density, while having a positive contribution to many indicators of 
sustainability, is associated with less affordable housing. Trade-offs can also be seen when the 
property industry uses compact city principles to establish city living as a profitable sub-market. 
Using the case of Leeds, Unsworth (2007) highlights how developments in line with compact city 
principles have prioritised economic gains over environmental or social ones. 
A second strategy is to focus on cities within the same national context and to compare the effects 
of high and low urban compaction on other dimensions. In their study of 26 municipalities in British 
Columbia, Alexander and Tomalty (2002) found that while there was an association between 
density, efficiency of infrastructure provision and reduced car use, it did not necessarily bring greater 
affordability or access to green space (p403). The same conclusions are reached by two other 
studies, highlighting the way in which this trade-off seems to have a ‘global’ character. In their study 
of 92 towns and cities in Taiwan, Lin and Yang (2006) found that compact city characteristics had 
positive effects in terms of urban production and enterprise investment but had negative effects in 
terms of the availability of green-space, crime rates and housing affordability (Lin and Yang 2006). In 
yet a different context, Thinh et al. (2002) looked at the degree of compactness of the settlement 
structure of 116 German cities. In their model, compactness is defined as a high degree of surface 
sealing (the percentage of the total surface that is impermeably covered) – that is, as the degree of 
concentration of the built-up land in the urban system. For example, compact cities such as 
Memmingen have, “ideal settlement patterns comprising a densely self-contained built-up area in 
the centre with self-contained built-up areas radiating outwards” (Thinh et al. 2002: p487). However, 
when running a cluster analysis on the 116 cities in their sample, they found that two indicators 
were sufficient to separate out the cities in five distinct groups: the degree of sealing in a city’s urban 
nucleus and land price in the form of purchase values for developed land (EUR/m2). Both of these 
two indicators increase together from the first group (in which there is a low degree of sealing in the 
urban nucleus) to the last – more centrally compact – group of cities, indicating a strong trade-off 
between compactness in the city centre and affordable land prices. 
Those who have studied this trade-off between the economic and environmental dimensions make a 
number of recommendations. Dave (2010), for example, highlights the need to carefully maintain 
the quality and level of living space (p23). The capture of compact city principles by the property 
industry can be changed only through pressures from buyers and renters for higher environmental 
performance and more demanding planning policies and building regulations. We need to secure 
policies that can mitigate the negative consequences of compact city policies in terms of 
affordability and access to green space (Alexander and Tomalty 2002: p403). Some successful 
policies include involving local residents, promoting affordable housing and seeking more 
involvement from higher tiers of government (Alexander and Tomalty 2002). In the context of 
Taiwan, Lin and Yang (2006: p379) recommend, among others, the provision of green space and 
public facilities, encouraging community greening and putting more responsibility for mitigating 
environmental impact on developers.  
2.3.2 Trade-offs within the social dimension 
Another type of distributional consequence relates to the compact city project’s effects within the 
social dimension alone. So far, two main perspectives have been raised on the ways in which 
compact city principles may lead to trade-offs between different social objectives. The first is that of 
social sustainability. Bramley and Power (2009) describe this trade-off by using a number of urban 
form measures (density, house type mix, etc.) in combination with census data for small areas. Here 
they found that “the effects on our two main dimensions of social sustainability - social equity and 
sustaining communities - work in opposite directions. Policy must therefore think in terms of trade-
offs between social objectives” (p46). This focus on social sustainability can also be found in a study, 
by Dempsey et al. (2012), of fifteen neighbourhoods across five UK cities. In this study, they 
specifically focused on the influence of density on social sustainability, finding that while some 
aspects of social sustainability were positively influenced by density (better access to services, more 
non-motorised transport), other aspects were more problematic. In higher density areas they found 
a lower provision and use of public and green spaces, higher feelings of insecurity and generally 
lower levels of social interaction (Dempsey et al. 2012). 
Another perspective on the possible trade-offs that accompany the implementation of compact city 
principles within the social dimension is that of social equity. Burton’s (2000) investigation of the 
effects of greater compactness on social equity in 25 medium sized English cities is the first study to 
take such an approach. The trade-offs she finds are within those aspects of compactness that relate 
to social equity; for example, compactness may improve public transport use and reduce social 
segregation, while at the same time is likely to mean less domestic living space and a lack of 
affordable housing (Burton 2000). She concludes that the compact city project, “may support equity, 
but only if implemented in such a way that maximises benefits and ameliorates potential problems” 
(Burton 2000: p1988). Foord (2010), in her study of the London neighbourhood of Clerkenwell, uses 
a similar framework. She finds that the encouragement of mixed-use developments (an aim often 
associated with higher density in the UK), led to the prioritisation of certain groups over others, 
development rarely provided the range of social infrastructure to support communities and, 
moreover, tended to produce transient communities (p59). This occurs to the detriment of existing 
communities who cannot engage in a similar high consumption lifestyle (Foord 2010). Similarly, in 
his comparison of Portland and Seattle, Aurand (2010) finds that for higher densities to support the 
provision of more affordable housing it needs to be accompanied by a larger variety of housing 
types.  
2.3.3 Trade-offs between individual and collective goals 
Other pragmatists focus on the difficulty of applying compact city principles in real world contexts. 
Downs (2005) identifies eight principles of action that may be problematic in this respect. For 
example, he discusses how moving from a sprawling urban form to one predicated on smart growth 
principles would upset the existing benefit structure, with for example, those whose property values 
were contingent on further suburbanisation likely to lose out. Similarly, smart growth projects 
necessitate the transfer of powers from local to regional or state authorities; a move that is resisted 
by officials at all levels (Downs 2005). On the basis of large-scale telephone surveys, Lewis and 
Baldassare (2010) also find reasons to doubt the easy application of compact city principles. For 
example, “many respondents desirous of a short commute are also attached to low density and to 
single-use residential areas, apparently seeing no contradiction. Likewise, individuals who tell survey 
interviewers they are interested in pedestrian-oriented environments, willing to ride and subsidize 
transit, and desirous of limiting sprawl may still be unwilling to support compact development when 
proposed near their homes” (p235). And Vallance et al. (2005) discuss the extent to which 
perceptions of infill in Christchurch strongly colour local residents’ views of compact city projects. All 
three of these studies propose pragmatic solutions to increase the appeal of compact city policies to 
those who will be affected by them on the ground. 
2.3.4 Maximising or optimising density 
A key distinction in practice, and implicit in the discussion of trade-offs, is that between the 
maximising and optimising of density. A crude position on maximising density is that, to the extent 
that density brings benefits, greater density will bring greater benefits. The discourse of conviction 
has tended to focus on the maximisation of density insofar as it has assumed that benefits will 
simply flow from density rather than asking searching questions about the point at which dis-
benefits may outweigh gains. Arguably this is a tactical rather than a naïve position, as advocates of 
density in an Anglo-American setting have to counter a strong culture of suburbanisation, conceding 
too soon the limits of density may weaken their position and allow for a push back from proponents 
of lower density. In that the discourse of suspicion encompasses a more fundamental questioning of 
state intervention it is more likely to see the market as a mechanism for optimising density. In this 
free market view, which imperfect information and other market failures, people will exercise choice 
in the market regarding the density of property that they will either rent or buy. People will weigh 
up the advantages and disadvantages of density as part of a bundle of characteristics that will make 
them favour one property over another. Where not left only to the market, the question of 
optimising density is a key concern, if not a defining characteristic of the discourse of pragmatism. If 
we are intervening in the market and if we are promoting an increase in density what is the optimal 
density in any given place?  
At the most basic level there is the question of how we measure density and the impacts of different 
measures. While this may at first appear an easy task, different methods can produce quite different 
outcomes. If the measure is in units per hectare, then we may achieve a high number of one-
bedroom flats, or flats with minimal internal space, which may not provide the desired outcome in 
terms of mix of property size. This is evidenced in practice through the development of a Density 
Matrix in the London Plan (section 4). Precisely this problem emerged and the first matrix was 
amended to focus more on habitable rooms per hectare rather than simply units and to recognise 
that family sized housing might (or should) be developed in central and inner London (Bowie 2008: 
10). Focusing more on habitable rooms recognises the ‘trade off’ between maximising the number of 
units and the need for units with more bedrooms for families with children. In both case we can 
infer the number of residents per hectare by assuming that units are occupied optimally (so a flat 
with one double and two single bedroom will house four people). However, there is often a gap 
between what we anticipate through measurement and what people do. People often buy more 
space when they can afford it (and under-occupy a property) while those with fewer resources will 
over-occupy to reduce per-person housing costs. Therefore, any measure of density, if not applied 
with caution, can lead to the production of the wrong mix of unit sizes and, in addition, market 
choices and necessity mean that there is no guaranteed link between the ‘planned’ and actual 
density of people per hectare achieved. This is significant if we argue a case for there being optimal 
densities. 
To summarise this section, we have set out three positions reflected in the literature, which provide 
us with the following simplified position. In one corner we have a normatively driven, idealistic cadre 
of urbanists seeking to push for greater density because it is prerequisite for a more sustainable 
future. In the second, we see the free market advocates who view state planned density as at best 
naïve and at worst a sinister attempt to foist on people an urban form that is not in their interest. 
They therefore seek to challenge more fundamentally the planning process itself. While this position 
has its own, strong and convincing, internal logic it may be subject to the same criticism as that 
levelled at Marxist economic analysis. This is that the very strength provided by the logic of a 
hermetic argument is also a weakness, as it tends to ignore immediate realities. In this case, that 
reality is that politicians are likely to continue to make policy on density. In the absence of a 
complete market revolution and the transformation or indeed elimination of state planning, those 
engaged in ‘minimal state’ arguments through the discourse of suspicion (O’Toole for example) have 
relatively little to say on the continued practice of developing at higher density other than it should 
be left purely to the market. This directs us to the third corner, the discourse of pragmatism that 
asks questions about optimal levels of density within a planned rather than entirely free market 
system and which is largely silent on, or assumes, the appropriateness of intervention in the market.  
Following Boyko & Cooper we argue that the discourse of conviction rests on a simplified view of 
density that sees it as  “… an independent variable to be manipulated to measure the effects of 
something else….” (2011: p18). The effect of this is that proponents can take a given theme and use 
density as a simplistic variable to indicate its good or bad contribution. This hides the complexity of 
density; that it works in a context, differently with different variables and there is a composite 
effect. Therefore, we might argue independently that higher density promotes public transport use, 
as more people can live near to a train station or bus stop. We can also argue that density is socially 
beneficial as we can provide more social housing as part of wider development. However, once we 
link these two we may find that the benefits of living near a train station is capitalised through 
higher property prices meaning that less social housing can be provided within a set budget. While 
the discourse of suspicion would suggest that this demonstrates the futility of the claims of planners 
for density, the discourse of pragmatism asks whether the outcome could be further moderated and 
in so doing starts to engage with the complexity of moving towards, if not achieving all of, the win-
win claims that are made for density through the discourse of conviction. Returning to our example, 
the possible reduction in levels of affordable housing near to transport hubs, there is the potential in 
the UK for the use of mechanisms such as legal agreements (Section 106) in order to intervene in 
this market effect and to provide a proportion of affordable housing. However, as Bowie (2008) 
demonstrates, while in London the London Plan was strongly supportive of affordable housing, 
higher density housing has been accompanied by an undersupply of family sized homes. The 
attempts at balancing market responses and the broader aims of higher density development are 
complex and it is this complexity that is at the heart of our interest and is returned to in sections five 
and six where we hear from local planners about their attempts to achieve such a balance and there 
reflections on the outcomes.  
From their extensive review of the literature Boyko & Cooper identify a series of categories of 
advantages and disadvantages arising from higher density development (Table one). These emerge 
from all three discourses that we have identified and we use them to indicate the complexity of 
density and to structure our research, which looks at the extent to which discourses of conviction, 
suspicion or pragmatism impact on, and are held by practitioners. To what extent do practitioners 
view and handle density simplistically as an unquestioned good and as an independent variable that 
will separately lead to a series of gains or, alternatively, do they employ techniques to manage and 
balance the various and sometimes competing claims for density? In order to address this question 
we seek first to contextualise contemporary planning practice in England both by looking at long 
term approaches and attitudes towards density in England and the present structures of planning 
through which density is currently delivered.  
PLACE TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE 
 
3. The conceptualisation of the ‘compact city’ in England2 
Planning reflects national imaginings of the city and country, for example, while the cultural elite’s 
centre of gravity in France is the city, in England it is the country – or at least an imagined rural idyll. 
The point is illustrated by comparing the suburbs, while the Banlieue of Paris represent the furthest 
the working class can penetrate into the city (they represent a class exclusion from the centre) the 
Anglo-American suburb has long represented the furthest the middle classes could get from the city 
while still being able to commute back in for work3. Early modern planning unintentionally set the 
model for the relatively low density suburb as Howard’s Garden City provided the intellectual 
underpinning first, for Hampstead Garden Suburb and then, through much debasement as a 
marketing tool, for private sector suburban development drawing on the terminology of the Garden 
                                                          
2 This section is based on an earlier web document   Anon & Anon 2014 see references for full details. 
3 Whilst, in reality, this is a simplification as there are working class public-housing suburbs in outer London and leafy green Banlieue 
around Paris, the general difference between the two supports the broader point. 
City rather than its social principles. Ray Unwin, one of the architects who worked on the first 
Garden City at Letchworth and later on Hampstead Garden Suburb was influential as a member of 
the Tudor Walters committee whose recommendations on housing standards, including a density of 
12 houses per acre, was institutionalised through the Housing & Town Planning Act of 1919, which 
set out provisions for public housing. The legacy of the Garden City, including the density provisions 
of the 1919 Act, does not mean that national policy and planning has had an entirely sanguine 
relationship with suburban development. The rapid rise of private sector suburbs during the inter-
war period took place under a light-touch planning regime where local authorities had limited 
powers to control the development. The rapid expansion, especially around London, saw the 
development of early planning legislation including the Restriction of Ribbon Development Act 
(Ministry of Transport 1935) and greenbelt policy (first mooted by the Greater London Regional 
Planning Committee in 1935). Although greenbelts sought to address sprawl, policy makers were 
quiet on any correlation between restricting city boundaries and increasing densities. The greenbelt 
was not intended to encourage greater density, simply to stop the expansion of the suburbs into the 
rural heartlands.  
New Town policy avoided the need for greater density in cities constrained by greenbelts. They 
provided planned dispersal from the city in a way that the private sector suburbs had not. The New 
Towns Act of 1946 and the Town Development Act of 1952 facilitated these. The first wave of New 
Towns reproduced low-density residential development but away from the old cities. In fact, the low 
level of density in the new developments led to them being criticised for being more villages than 
towns as they lacked an urban character – similar to the Garden Cities with which they shared their 
conceptual roots. The key point here is that New Towns provided clearly defined settlements that 
didn’t sprawl into the countryside, but they did not necessarily provide density. 
3.1 The role of the state 
If the suburbs were largely built in a permissive context of weak planning, the New Towns were 
delivered through a planning system, which in England was founded in a strong 
statist/interventionist philosophy that underpinned the pivotal 1947 Planning Act. This had 
nationalised the right to develop land, although land remained in private ownership. At the point of 
conception, it was assumed that the public sector would deliver the vast majority of all new housing 
and that the explosive private-sector dominated suburbanisation of the inter-war period would 
never be repeated. At first this assumption was realised as between 1946 and 1950, eighty per cent 
of all new housing was delivered by the public sector (Hall 2002: p82), some of this via the New 
Towns programme. While the '47 Act still sets out the basic foundations of planning in the UK, 
nationalisation of the right to develop, the relationship between market and state has since changed 
fundamentally. The significance of this for planning in England is that the system now has a hybrid 
quality to it. The logic of state control of the right to develop land, combined with a dominant state 
housing sector, was soon eroded as the private sector took up the development of housing. The 
oil/energy crisis of 1973 and national budget crises saw the rise of a new narrative where the state 
would deliver less - this was brought into sharp relief by the election of Thatcher and what was to 
become the long Conservative administration of 1979-1997, which effectively ended the state’s role 
in developing housing. The result is that the right to develop is still overseen by the state but the 
resources to develop are almost entirely within the private sector. The state, therefore, has to 
realise its housing ambitions, including density and the wider ambitions of urban renaissance, 
through the private sector.  
The extent to which the state uses its planning powers in pursuit of wider social goals has waxed and 
waned over time. The 1968 Planning Act moved away from the emphasis on land use in the 1947 
Act, seeking to have planning take into account wider social issues as part of the development 
process. Under Thatcher the appropriate scope of planning was redefined making it a narrower, 
regulatory function with its purpose again being broadened under New Labour. Thornley (1991) 
provides a detailed consideration of the impacts of Thatcherism on planning. Despite the anti-state 
rhetoric of Thatcher’s administration and changes to planning law, the challenge to planning was not 
unambiguous. As Thornley points out, the administration retained a strong centralist stance, while it 
sought to curtail the role of local government and local planning, the central state continued to use 
planning powers including the use of the ‘call in’ to the Secretary of State. Moreover, some planning 
policy opened up divisions within the Conservative's constituency. For example, relaxing greenbelt 
policy is approved of by house builders but raises the ire of the countryside lobby both of which 
could be seen to be traditional Conservative supporters. This was tested when a new, more 
development friendly, Planning Circular on the greenbelt was issued in 1983 only to be replaced the 
following year by one reverting to the previous policy stance (Thornley 1991: p213). Reflecting the 
point made by Raco (2005); planning is not always predictably captured by business interests (not 
least because these are not singular) and does not guarantee the roll out of neo-liberal policy.  
As in the case of the greenbelt, the Conservative’s desire to free up the planning system and to open 
up land for development has long clashed with their heartland rural vote, which strongly favours the 
protection of the countryside from major house building. That the UK planning system has become 
particularly focussed – if not defined by - the preservation of the countryside (Hall 1973) is a point 
driven home every time figures are produced projecting new housing demand. The 1992 projections 
released in 1995 generated a storm of criticism, in particular the growth rates for the Southeast 
(Holmans 2012). It has been argued that a long cultural tradition has made substantial development 
in the countryside near to impossible in England, leading Hall (1973) to consider that the ’47 Act was 
the start of a continuing policy of the containment of urban England. This has generated, over a long 
period of time, deep-seated propertied interests and associated lobbies who have a continuing 
interest in maintaining stasis within the system. As the countryside and the greenbelt have become 
institutions, in their own right, political parties, of any hue, have had to deal with entrenched 
resistance to new housing on greenfield sites. This political reality has only been exaggerated by the 
long-term shift of economic activity and housing demand to the south and southeast of the country, 
placing exceptional demand for new housing in the part of the country already most densely settled. 
While the majority of market evidence suggests that newly forming households wanted street 
housing often suburban in style (MORI 2002), existing home owners outside the city were 
determined to prevent the arrival of new neighbours. The Campaign for the Protection of Rural 
England never tires of reminding politicians how the countryside can only continue to exist by 
ensuring that future housing demand is met by delivering new households within existing urban 
boundaries, a policy which has increasingly required higher density housing in the absence of a 
modern New Towns policy. 
3.1.1 High-rise as a component of density 
Although high-rise is not necessarily a requirement of higher density and indeed much of the flatted 
developments of 60s and 70s Britain were not, strictly speaking, high density,4 we argue that the 
government’s promotion of this urban form left a legacy that had to be countered as part of New 
Labour’s return to the city. Although much public housing up until the Second World War was semi-
detached and terraced street properties often in expanding suburbs, the post-war housing grant 
regime was used to encourage flatted development. Between 1956 and 1967, the scheme paid local 
authorities higher levels of subsidies for building taller public housing stock – the higher the building 
the higher the grant, although after 1967 the benefit was capped to six storey buildings. However, if 
this wave of development challenged the long English tendency to build street properties, the 
execution of the policy did not represent a turn to high-rise living on the part of the English. Rather, 
these developments only served to support the doubters, as the high-rise blocks of the period were 
often poorly constructed and so provided an unsatisfactory environment with damp and/or water 
ingress being a problem. Insufficient maintenance of communal spaces and lifts also proved 
problematic in terms of liveability, as did the layout of blocks, which sometimes produced ‘dead 
spaces’ seen as encouraging crime. The collapse of one corner of the Rowan Point tower block in 
1968 (killing three) galvanised those opposed to high-rise residential development in the UK and 
neutered the modernist movement in England (Swenarton 2002). Even when the stock was of better 
                                                          
4 If one measures density across an entire site (as opposed to the footprint of the building), these high-rise 
blocks were often not producing higher density urban forms than the street properties they replaced. 
quality there were problems in practice. For example, towers that were surrounded by large aprons 
of grass produced maintenance and care issues as there were not clear demarcations of who was 
responsible for upkeep. Moreover, these buildings were commonly located outside the city on 
cheaper land away from public transport links and sources of employment (these were British 
Banlieue); Salford offers one of many examples of such ‘island high-rise’ estates in England.  
Density has therefore often been associated with past forays into high-rise living in England, which 
have not tended to be marked by success. This has meant that there was little to suggest that the 
British middle classes were ready and willing to embrace an urban renaissance predicated on images 
of ‘city’, ‘density’, and ‘apartment life’. For some who saw high-rise to be a failure in the UK but who 
supported density there was no problem, as a number of writers showed, traditional street patterns 
and street front development could produce equal or higher densities than the much maligned high-
rise (Schoon 2001: p250). However, Bowie (2008) strongly contests this, arguing that development 
at the density seen in London in the 2000s is inevitably delivered through high-rise. Despite the 
claims of those of who have sought to uncouple higher density and high-rise, Bowie’s position 
appears o be validated by the extent to which post-millennial higher density development was 
delivered through mid and high-rise development and not street properties. 
3.2 From greenfield to brown 
As we have seen, the long tradition in England is of dispersal and suburbanisation. Recent 
environmental/sustainability discourse as it relates to planning in England can be crudely divided 
into two key phases, which are only partly contiguous with changes in national administration. An 
essential element of the roll-out of neo-liberalism was a physical rolling out of development into 
suburban and peripheral areas (see Peck 2011 for a discussion of the American case); this period 
covers roughly 1979 to 1990. From the 1990s we see elements of roll-back as the Conservative 
administration met with growing opposition (not least from its own support base) to the 
development of swathes of retail sheds and new housing on greenfield sites (Lord & Tewdwr-Jones 
2012; Allmendinger & Houghton 2013). The New Labour administration, post 1997, continued the 
roll-back, but whereas the emphasis had previously been on protecting the countryside now the 
focus was also on a positive vision of how the city could deliver economic, social and environmental 
solutions.  
• 1979- early 1990s: Early Conservative administration; roll-back of planning, development of 
edge of town development;  
• Early 1990s to 1997: later Conservative introduction of restrictions in response to earlier policy 
outcomes. Restrictions on peripheral development; increasing stress on sustainability. 
• 1997-2010: ‘New’ Labour administration; continuation of neo-liberal principles of former 
administration. Roll out of array of ‘neo-liberal’ social, environmental and economic 
programmes; but more positively focussed on the city (urban regeneration & renaissance).  
• 2010-present: coalition government; roll back of programmes, localism as metaphor for smaller 
central government. Potentially a roll out of development to fringe and rural areas. 
As we have already seen, the Thatcher project as it related to planning was not a simple, 
unambiguous case of laissez-faire even while Thatcher was Prime Minister. Moreover, in the later 
years of the long Conservative administration, in particular when John Major was Prime Minister 
(1990-1997), there was a less ideological approach to planning; most significantly for this work, 
under John Gummer (SoS for the environment 1993-97), the laissez-faire approach to, for example, 
out of town shopping came to end with the updating of government guidance on retail (DoE 1993; 
DoE 1996) and on transport (DoT 1994). When New Labour came to power in 1997 they continued 
the restorative work started by Gummer, attempting to reign-in further the tendency to out of town 
development that had taken off during the Thatcher years, especially the explosive growth of out of 
town retail development. Despite changing administrations basic tensions in the planning and supply 
of housing remained. New Labour in many respects represented a continuation of the previous 
administration, not least in terms of the relationship between the state and private sector. New 
Labour did not seek to reverse the withdrawal of the state from the direct provision of housing and 
faced a continuing problem with housing undersupply. The 1996 projection for new housing need 
was released in 1999 (now under the New Labour administration), and predictably saw a similar 
furore to that accompanying the release of previous projections with press reports talking of the 
paving over of rural England. 
3.3 Urban renaissance 
There were early portents of how New Labour would address housing demand. On coming to power 
in 1997, the new Prime Minister, Tony Blair, moved to number 10 Downing Street from his family 
home in Islington N1; this inner-city move predicated a policy framework that conceived of the city 
in positive terms and was, arguably, revolutionary in a country where the idea of the suburbs as a 
desirable permanent residential location for the middle-class family first saw the light of day 
(Fishman 1987). In the run up to the end of the millennium, in the years after Blair had moved from 
London N1 to SW1, the government started to formulate a policy approach to the city that saw it as 
a positive place where social challenges could be addressed rather than as the place where social 
problems were simply concentrated and over-represented (Hoskins & Tallon, 2004). In this 
rethinking of the city, the administration was greatly assisted by a quiet, private movement that had 
been underway for several decades. Islington, the location of Blair’s former home, was where Glass 
had, in the 1960s, observed the encroachment of the middle-class into previously working-class 
neighbourhoods of the inner-city, coining the term gentrification to describe this change (Glass 
1964). Long before changes in government policy promoting the city as a residential location, 
elements of the middle-class had already chosen it over the suburbs. When the Urban Task Force 
(1999) set out its vision for the revitalisation of the city by bringing in a broader middle-class 
residential population it drew on the existing symbolism of gentrification, red wine and coffee 
houses. This lead Lees (2003), in deconstructing the report’s language, to argue that the term urban 
renaissance simply provided cover for the entirely less acceptable outcome, gentrification. 
Regardless of the politics of gentrification, the Urban Task Force were to some extent pushing at an 
open door. Their proposals resonated with broader changes in the economy associated with 
globalisation, including the agglomeration of key functions in cities. Linked to this, New Labour’s 
leadership has a distinctly metropolitan edge to it, making it part of the new city zeitgeist. The new 
city-focused economy was driven by an economic logic that New Labour had no intention of resisting 
but which could be supported by socially progressive claims as the urban provided a focus for house 
building that now had a rationale founded in sustainability and which had the additional benefit of 
avoiding political resistance to new house building on greenfield land. Notwithstanding this broad 
shift, the Task Force was ambitious in seeking to broaden out the appeal of city living beyond, as 
there is reason to believe that there are substantial cultural differences within the middle-class 
between gentrifiers and those who opt for suburban living (Butler with Robson 2005).  
Having been out of power for 17 years, New Labour brought in a tide of reforms, which, although 
they appeared to be coherent in the rhetoric, were less so in the detail. It was often the local 
authorities that had the task of stitching it all together in practice (Colomb 2007). The new focus on 
building at higher densities in cities promised, among other things, reduced social division through 
proximity, reduced car use by linking work-residential location and with density supporting public 
transport use and preventing the need for new infrastructure associated with greenfield 
development. The challenge of ‘joining the dots’ to deliver the win-win claims of New Labour was 
made more difficult for planners by fissures within government. The two key relationships that 
impacted planning were first, that between the Treasury and the Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister (ODPM), which oversaw planning and, second, internal divisions within the ODPM. This first 
can broadly be summarised as a tension between the Treasury that saw planning negatively as a 
constraint on economic development and the ODPM that viewed planning as potentially a useful 
tool to serve the wider social purposes of the government. The Treasury/ODPM relationship 
continued the long standing critique of planning as a brake on the economy, it failed to deliver 
enough housing in the right places, large scale infrastructure was held up by interminable inquiries 
and business was restricted in its ability to respond to changing economic circumstances. 
Significantly, it was the Treasury that put forward Kate Barker to lead a review of the planning 
process (2005-06) and, in particular, the delivery of housing. This provided a narrative unashamedly 
focused on the economic while the ODPM was developing the sustainability meta-narrative that 
sought to provide a new unifying purpose for the profession after the wilderness years under the 
long Conservative administration. In practice, while the ODPM was making expansive claims for the 
purpose of planning the Treasury was applying pressure to achieve a more narrowly focused 
economic agenda. One way of partially resolving this impasse, on which both the Treasury and the 
ODPM could agree, was to make planning demonstrably more efficient. Under the rubric of New 
Public Management planning was charged with meeting a range of outputs (rather than outcomes); 
this had the effect of focusing planning on a narrow range of targets such as time taken to 
determine an application and so, arguably, diverted planners from the broader, and less readily 
measured, claims for density which formed part of the wider agenda of the ODPM. 
The result of this tension between Treasury desires to speed up planning and make it more market 
friendly, and ODPM ideas of creating a new meta-narrative for the profession, was that planning, 
while newly re-focused on sustainability was constantly reminded of the weight of the economic 
argument. It had always to be justified in terms of its own efficiency. Clearly related to the rise of 
New Public Management, the more utopian rhetoric of the ODPM in defining a new purpose for 
planning was accompanied by the introduction of a bank of targets; in addition to timescales for 
determining applications, these included timescales for plan development, a focus on housing 
numbers and on the proportion delivered on previously used land. The Sustainable Communities 
Plan (Sustainable Communities: Building for the Future), (ODPM 2003), illustrated the Treasury-
ODPM tension. This document is notable for employing the dual empty signifiers of sustainable and 
community in its title and thus provided the right mood music for the ODPM, which was important 
as it allowed them to deliver what was, in essence, a Treasury driven national policy on housing 
development. Previous attempts to do so had traditionally met with strong opposition as they were 
considered to be insensitive to local communities and to the environment. Sustainable communities 
were to be delivered through a new regional approach to housing delivery reflecting Treasury 
demands to privilege the shift of the economy to the south. The Sustainable Communities Plan set 
out high levels of housing development in the south of England and the promise of some 
regeneration for the North. Reflecting the instrumentalisation of ‘compact cities’, in the North it 
would provide a reimaging of former industrial cities while in the south it would meet the need for 
more housing under conditions of urban containment.  
Planning’s role was fluid and in practice sometimes peripheral with emphasis on particular targets 
rather than the unifying strategic vision that spatial planning was claimed to deliver. Moreover, it 
was not always evident at first what influence the emerging mix of policy and targets would have in 
relation to one another. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of policy on density and 
targets for the re-use of brownfield land. Under New Labour the minimum density target in national 
policy was a very modest 30dph. Having a minimum target may have sent out a signal that the 
government wanted higher density but the threshold was a low one which, we might speculate, was 
modest by political necessity as a higher minimum target would have raised the ire of local 
politicians in more suburban and rural authorities. However, targets for the proportion of housing on 
brownfield land were far more significant in terms of driving a new form of higher density 
development as the location and nature of these sites required density to achieve viability 
(Karadimitriou 2013).  
As we turn to the London case studies it is useful to summarise the context in which local authorities 
were tasked with delivering the urban renaissance, included in which was a turn to a higher density 
built form.  
• A long-term culture of lower density development 
o Unsuccessful experience of high rise – which inaccurately equates to higher density 
in the public imagination 
• Shifting political ambitions for planning which over decades contracted and expanded 
ambitions for planning  
The significance of this was 
• Planners had limited experience of delivering quality through higher density 
• Politicians had good reason to oversell the benefits of higher density/ urban renaissance; not 
least, to overcome popular tastes for lower density living. 
• Planners were newly linked with an ambitious, if not always coherent, agenda marked by a 
mix of new policy and targets 
 
4. The case of London 
The historic emphasis in the UK on urban dispersal applied to London as to elsewhere. This 
happened both through official policy such as New Towns and market responses, mainly 
suburbanisation. As a result, London lost population between 1931 and 1991, although for decades 
it was only present-day inner London that lost population (not least to outer London). After 1961 
outer London also started to lose population, both have been gaining population since 1991. It does 
not follow that changes in policy are solely, even primarily responsible for these changes; the drift of 
employers to the suburbs provides at least part of the explanation for the earlier loss of population 
just as the later turn to the city is reflective of changing employment patterns sometimes associated 
with globalisation. Globalisation has brought both wealth and distress, often in close proximity, but 
taken as a whole London has been one of the winners. The London and southeast economy has 
increasingly pulled away from the rest of the UK. The economic ‘successes’ of London are reflected 
in the property and employment sectors. The central London housing market has become 
increasingly global as international investors develop property portfolios in London and this has 
impacted demand and prices beyond the centre (Hamnett 2009). Just as London was impacted only 
moderately by the Depression of the 1930s (there was a massive boom in house building in London 
in this inter-war period), the current economic turndown has only had a modest impact.  
London, therefore, remains both a fascinating testing ground that warrants study but also a 
perennial exception. This applies to the economics of housing as to so many other aspects of policy 
and society (Karadimitriou 2013). We pick up on some of this exceptionalism as we continue but 
here we note that London is also exceptional within the UK it its planning and governance 
arrangements. After coming to power in 2010 the coalition government (Conservative dominated 
with Liberal-Democrat partners), abolished the regional structure of governing and planning in 
England. The devolved and distinctive administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
remain but in England all regions were abolished except in London where the Greater London 
Authority remains as a ‘regional’ authority that sits between the national government and the 
London Boroughs. Uniquely in London, there remains a regional plan that sits between the National 
Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) (DCLG 2012), that the coalition government has introduced, and 
the local plans of the 32 boroughs (plus the City of London). The London Plan has been through a 
series of alterations since its adoption in 2004 but we focus here on the original plan as this set the 
context for the developments that we look at later. The 2004 London Plan projected sustained 
growth in economy, jobs and households. It estimated an additional 336,000 new households in the 
capital by 2016 equating to an addition of 22,400 households per annum. Significantly, Mayor Ken 
Livingston set out the intention of containing London’s growth within its existing borders, a radical 
break from London’s suburban expansions in the Victorian and the inter-war periods: “Having 
already absorbed the equivalent of the population of Sheffield in the last 15 years, London is 
expected to grow by the equivalent of population of Leeds in the next decade and half. To sustain 
and improve London’s environment, this increase must be absorbed without expansion into the 
existing greenbelt or encroaching on London’s internal green spaces” (GLA 2004: pxi). It is 
noteworthy that since the 2004 Plan, later data have indicated even stronger growth than expected 
in London’s population, between the 2001 and 2011 Census the population of London has increased 
by 14%, a million people, to 8.17 million with a greater increase in inner London (17%) than in outer 
London (12%). 
The Plan outlined a Density Matrix that set a, “ strategic framework for appropriate densities at 
different locations, [that], aims to reflect and enhance existing local character by relating the 
accessibility of an area to appropriate development and the number of car parking spaces that 
should be provided” (GLA 2004: p176). London density policy had evolved from the mid 1990s, prior 
to the establishing of the GLA. When the Density Matrix approach found its place in the 2004 
London Plan it emphasised higher density development based on a six-point public transport 
accessibility level (PTAL; where six was best served and one least), the character of location 
(mentioned as ‘setting’ distinguished as suburban, urban and central) and the character of the 
development (design of typology, scale and massing) (Maccreanor Lavington et al. 2012; URS/Patel 
Taylor 2006). Based on these characteristics the density range suggested varied from 650-1100 hr/ha 
(habitable rooms per hectare) in central urban areas that are 10 minutes walking distance of a town 
centre, and with a PTAL of 6-4 (best access to public transport), to 150-200 hr/ha in remote 
suburban areas (PTAL of 2-1). The Plan therefore called on Boroughs to maximize the potential of 
development sites and sets out a Density Matrix as a guideline in order to enable, “developments 
[to] achieve this highest possible intensity of use” compatible with the above mentioned criteria 
(GLA 2004: p176 section 4B.3). 
The planning system is legally a hierarchical one so that the lower plan must always be in general 
conformity with the higher plan. In effect, the regional London Plan written by the Mayor of London 
must help deliver the aspirations set out in national planning documents. Likewise, the borough 
plans must each support the delivery of the London Plan (and so, logically, will support the delivery 
of national policy). Although the coalition government has made much of (sub-borough) localism 
and has facilitated the development of neighbourhood plans, these must, in turn, support the 
borough plan. Therefore, local plans are only able to add detail to, rather than articulate an 
alternative vision to, regional (in London) and national policy. In short, the planning system now 
incorporates a localised centralism. As well as adding detail to higher tier policy, lower tier plans can 
add policy so long as this does not undermine other higher tier policies. This applies to the London 
Plan density policies but here the NPPF is permissive as it simply states that, “To boost significantly 
the supply of housing, local planning authorities should: …set out their own approach to housing 
density to reflect local circumstances.” (NPPF 2012: p12). Therefore, while subject to refinement the 
Density Matrix has survived the change of national government.  
In this rest of this section we set out our London case-study which looks at developments in four 
London Boroughs; Tower Hamlets and Newham in inner London, and Barking & Dagenham and 
Croydon in outer London. The four study developments were selected using GLA (Greater London 
Authority) supplied data which recorded all permitted and completed development over 50 units in 
London since 2004 (the year of adoption of the first London Plan since the creation of the GLA which 
reinforced central government policy on increasing density and seeking development on previously 
used land). A balance of density and number of units was taken in to account (avoiding some 
authorities with very high density development but low numbers of units overall) with the aim of 
identifying authorities with experience of assessing applications that are, in a London context, at 
volume and at higher density. Two authorities were chosen from outer and two from inner London 
as this provided an opportunity to pick up on differences between these two contexts; inner city and 
suburban.  
In the period 2001 to 2011 Tower Hamlets has seen the greatest increase in number of households 
far outstripping the rate of increase in any other London borough. The two outer London boroughs 
have seen more modest growth. Tower Hamlets also has the highest density of population of the 
four study boroughs (Table two). These figures are relevant in that an older or younger, non-working 
age population might be expected to require more in terms of services. Barking and Dagenham is the 
London borough with the highest proportion of 0-15 year olds but the other boroughs in the study 
are not far behind. Newham and Tower Hamlets also have a relatively young age profile with fewer 
residents aged 65 and over (Table two). Using the GLA’s Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) category 
(broadly Asian, Chinese and Black British), Newham and Tower Hamlets have a majority BME 
population5. Average household size has increased in London over the same period from 2.35 to 
2.47persons and is highest in Newham at 3.01, which is noteable given the tendency to build one 
and two bedroom flats during this period. Brief details of the four developments are provided below 
before we turn to consider the research findings. 
INSERT TABLE TWO AROUND HERE 
All four of the case study boroughs were and are expected to contribute substantially to future 
housing need in London. In the 2004 London Plan the 20 year target minimum targets for the 
provision of conventional homes (not students housing or houses in multiple occupation) was as 
follows: Barking & Dagenham, 10,110; Croydon, 17,020; Newham, 17,1770; and Tower Hamlets, 
41,280 where the all-London range (excluding the City of London) was between 5360 (Richmond) 
and 41,280 (Tower hamlets). The capacity of London boroughs to accommodate new housing was 
                                                          
5 http://data.london.gov.uk/visualisations/atlas/borough-profiles/atlas.html 
and is not related to their current population density so boroughs with large amounts of open space 
and/or lower density housing may have far lower identified capacity than those with higher density 
populations (Figure one). This is partly a function of greenbelt policy where Bromley is the most 
extreme example, the largest of London’s boroughs at just over 150km2 more than half (80km2) is 
metropolitan greenbelt. There is, therefore, no clear link between future housing capacity and 
current population density meaning that some of the most dense boroughs will also host the 
greatest amount of future housing (Tower Hamlets, Southwark) while some of the least dense will 
see the least amount of new development (Richmond upon Thames, Merton).  
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The overall geography of new build is to the east of London, which is reflected in the location of our 
case studies (Figure two). This eastward bias is driven by a range of influences including the long-
standing Thames Gateway initiative which conceives of a development corridor running from the 
east end of London along the Thames deep into Essex as far as Southend and in Kent to Sheerness. 
Linked to the London end of Thames Gateway is the Olympic 2012 site with the development for and 
after the Olympics also bringing forward other projects. In a longer historical context the area is one 
that was historically industrial and so there is a large quantity of previously used land available 
across the area.  
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Although, for those less familiar with London the Barking site may appear quite close to the inner 
London sites, on the ground there are marked differences. The Tower Hamlets site sits close to the 
centre of Docklands, London’s second finance core and the Newham site is near to the Olympic 2012 
site. The Dagenham site sits to the east of one of London’s orbital roads (A406 North Circular) and so 
‘feels’ a lot further away from central London than the other two locations. Some interesting 
contrasts appear when we look at the change in the density of new dwellings per hectare in the four 
case study boroughs over time and these serve to emphasise the locational difference between the 
inner London boroughs of Newham and Tower Hamlets and the outer ones of Barking and 
Dagenham and Croydon. In Figure three we show the change between 1996 and 2011. We have also 
looked at three administrative districts (roughly equivalent to the London Boroughs) that neighbour 
Greater London and which have the highest (Watford), mid (Spelthorne) and lowest (Three Rivers) 
amount of change. Watford and Three Rivers are to the northwest of London both in the county of 
Hertfordshire and Spelthorne is to the southwest in Surrey. There is a marked difference in the 
density of new development between our two outer and two inner London boroughs. Tower 
Hamlet’s new dwellings were built at 96dph in 1996 but by 2011 this has leapt to 385dph, an 
increase in the density of new build of 289dph. In other words a substantially different urban form is 
being delivered in the borough. The picture is similar in Newham. However, our outer London 
studies are more closely aligned with changes in density occurring in neighbouring districts outside 
London (and not affected by the London Plan). Although Croydon has increased the density of new 
build more than Watford (outside of London), it is still building at a slightly lower density (86dph 
against 87dph). The 2011 mid-point  for districts neighbouring London was 29dph and Spelthorne 
was the nearest to this at 27dph. Finally, Three Rivers shows a decrease over the period of -4 moving 
from 25 to 21dph for new build. This is not exceptional as three other districts showed no change 
(out of a total of 16 districts neighbouring London).  
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As noted earlier the London Plan Density Matrix sets out a range of densities depending on a 
number of criteria including access to public transport (measured as a Passenger Transport 
Accessibility Level or PTAL), and the existing setting including current densities, and where proximity 
to a town centre is a factor in producing an assessment of character; suburban, urban etc. The 
matrix therefore includes a precisely quantified element (PTAL) and a more open element (setting). 
All of our case studies are in the PTAL range 6-4 and we assessed them all in the urban setting (see 
Figure four). All of the developments are well in excess of this reading of the Density Matrix and, 
even were the developments to be categorised as being in a central location, only the Croydon 
development would be within the given range. This is reflective of Bowie’s (2008) work on 
development in London, which shows the high proportion of approvals for development in excess of 
the London Plan Density Matrix, a point we return to later. 
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4.1 Methods 
We carried out an online survey of all London heads of policy and development management teams. 
In total we received 17 responses from a possible 66 (26%). These covered 16 of London’s 32 
boroughs (plus the City of London), with 7 responses from inner London and 9 from outer. In the 
four case study areas we interviewed local government officers and building managers. The purpose 
was to focus on coordination through the various stages of delivering and managing density. On the 
delivery side, we focused on the relationship between policy (at different scales) and development 
management decisions, in how decisions were made about particular applications. We also sought 
to have local planning officers in planning reflect on what had been delivered. On the management, 
or living with density side, we focused on the day-to-day aspects of managing the building. Given the 
different roles we asked different questions of site managers and council officers. The aim was to 
look primarily at the decision making process but also to capture the outcomes of those decisions 
from the perspective of managing the resulting development. 
To understand the diversity of views from practice, we solicited interviews from the head of 
planning, head of planning policy and head of development management from the respective 
Boroughs. The purpose was to focus on coordination through the various stages of delivering and 
managing density. On the delivery side, we focused on the relationship between policy (at different 
scales) and development management decisions, in how decisions were made about particular 
applications. Some boroughs delegated one planning officer to talk on behalf of the council, while in 
others more than one officer obliged. In one of the boroughs two officers jointly attended and 
shared their diverse perspectives on density and development during the interview. All the senior 
planners that we interviewed had worked for their local authorities for a considerable period 
(between 5- 20 years), and had experience of working in other local authorities in London. They 
therefore knew not only the planning and development context of their boroughs, but also the 
broader policy context in London overall. Our survey respondents also had considerable experience 
of their Borough; ten had worked in their current authority for more than ten years, six for 1-5 years 
and one less than a year. The interviewees used many examples from their Borough during the 
discussions and were also encouraged to reflect on the selected case studies. This helped us to 
ground the discussions, particularly on the various forms of conflicts during the process and the 
lessons learned.  
Individual interviews lasted for about an hour and were conducted as a face-to-face discussion based 
on a set of semi-structured questions. The questions not only acted as a guide during the discussion 
but also enabled a system for comparison. Our questions primarily focused on four core themes. The 
first tried to gain an insight into officer’s knowledge and experience of managing higher density 
development. In this case we wanted them to engage with their perceptions and understanding 
about the drivers of density and how, if at all, ideas about sustainability or the compact city 
influenced the understanding of higher density development in the Borough. Our second theme 
engaged with specific planning and policy instruments and the institutional system for managing 
density. We were particularly concerned with the interaction between local, regional and national 
policies; the relationship to the provision of social infrastructure; the use of evidence in local policy; 
the adequacy and sufficiency of existing planning powers; and the measures for mitigating the 
potentially negative impacts of density. The third theme engaged with diverse expectations and 
preferences about development and density and the resulting conflicts that arise from diversity and 
their management. For example we explored themes like the dynamic relationship between 
planning officers and the council; the role of authorities while leading, following and controlling 
market preferences; the relationship between policy and development management practice; 
engagement with local politicians and local community; the balance sought between the social 
environmental and economic aspects of the compact city and finally the art of negotiating with 
diverse actors. The final theme examined the mechanisms that exist to learn from already-
implemented projects and their outcomes and the how these might influence the evolution of future 
policy and planning processes. Obtaining interviews with planning officers was easier than for 
building managers and interviewing building managers in the private blocks proved harder than 
interviewing the managers of the social housing blocks. In fact, in one development it proved 
impossible to interview the property manager of a particularly ‘high-end’ block of flats and in 
another the project manager only felt comfortable filing in a structured questionnaire after 
obtaining clearance from the developer. However, the housing managers of the social housing 
blocks obliged more willingly. Our questions to the housing managers focused around issues of day-
to-day management of the development. We were particularly interested in the economic, 
environmental and social robustness of the built form; the environmental performance of the 
building; costs passed on to residents; perceptions of its internal space standards; use of and 
performance of outdoor space and in any recurring problems of management, especially where 
those problems were linked to higher density development.  
Having interviewed officers and building managers in the four case study boroughs we transcribed 
all the data and coded it in Nvivo. We had four key coding categories (or nodes); claims, views, plans 
and process. For claims the coding was structured around Boyko & Cooper’s categories of ‘claims’ 
for density. Further coding under this category included the influence of the market on the claims 
for density. The second major node captured references to professional, political and public 
attitudes to density; here we recorded reference to the political, social and professional realities of 
delivering density. We were interested in the possible gap between professional views, where we 
assumed that delivering higher density would form part of the professional canon of planners and 
possible opposition from public and, possibly therefore, local politicians. The third node coded for 
references to national, regional and local policy, as we were interested in perceptions of which were 
the more influential. The final node coded for references to the process of delivery, looking at the 
relationship between formal policy and how decisions were actually made. This node includes sub-
categories for experience and learning – where evidence emerged from the interviews about formal 
and informal processes for learning, reflection and for feeding past experience into future policy and 
decision making processes.  
4.2 Barking and Dagenham 
The borough of Barking and Dagenham encompasses two distinct areas in east London with 
Dagenham being closely associated with a large Ford plant that once produced cars but is now a 
specialist engine plant. The borough is a mix of social and private housing much of it produced 
during the mid twentieth century at lower density. The borough includes the Beacontree Estate, 
which was developed by the London County Council in the 1920s, and 30s and is still one of largest 
public housing estates in Europe containing 30,000 homes. These were built as street properties 
with front and back gardens at suburban densities of around 12 units per acre and so are physically 
very different from the suburban banlieue which house the French working class. Beacontree, along 
with other public housing estates and private housing development, provided an escape from the 
poor housing conditions of inner London at the time when rent controls had the unintended 
consequence of restricting the supply of affordable rented accommodation. Therefore, people were 
pushed to the suburbs as much as pulled there and initially poor transport links back to jobs in the 
central city meant that some families chose to relocate back in the inner city (Saint 1989). Just as 
London saw its population fall so too did Barking, with census figures revealing an overall decline in 
population between 1951-1991. However, as part of the more general trend in London the borough 
has seen sharp rises in population during the recent period. 
The case study development was part of the Barking Town Centre redevelopment; the outline 
planning permission of which was given in 2002 to be developed in phases; the final phase of which 
was completed in 2007 (with planning permission to specific phases being granted in phases) and is 
built to a density of 423u/ha. The town centre redevelopment comprised an area of 1.6ha situated 
to the front of the Town Hall and Square close to shops and town centre uses with a high level of 
connectivity, scoring a PTAL of 6. The case study sites comprise of the building of 246 residential 
units, 2577m2 of retail, 7445m2 of office and a net increase of 3575m2 of community/public uses 
(Barking & Dagenham 2004). Barking town centre is defined as a district centre in the London Plan 
and so the area is considered urban for the purposes of the London Plan Density Matrix. Even 
though less than 2ha this scheme was designed to ‘define its own setting’ as a landmark for the 
Town Centre. 
Figure five shows part of the development much of which sits on former open-space which formed 
part of a public space outside the town hall (pictured, figure five). The image in the right of Figure 
five illustrates the pre-existing scale of development in the area where the tower of the town hall 
would once have dominated the skyline.  
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4.3 Croydon 
The second case is in the London Borough of Croydon, arguably the only part of the capital that 
includes an edge city (Phelps et al 2006), which is to the southeast of the case study development. 
The borough has good transport links including orbital connections across south London. It has a 
history as a centre for manufacturing including car production and was the site of an airport which 
ceased to function as London grew. It remains, however, relatively close to Gatwick one of London’s 
main airports. It has only experienced brief periods of population decline, the last between 1971 and 
1981. Historically the council has been unusually positive for a suburban borough in promoting the 
development of Croydon town centre and continues to actively seek its regeneration and 
redevelopment as an edge city office centre. However, while the borough promotes edge city 
development outside the ‘city’ sub-centre much of the borough remains a typical outer London 
location characterised by substantial tracts of inter war suburban development, much of this being 
private housing.  
The case study development was completed in 2008 and is built to a density of 399u/ha. It 
comprises, “[the] demolition of no 3 Broad Green Avenue; alterations to existing City House to 
include recladding of existing building and use of ground floor for commercial / nursery use and 
upper floors as residential accommodation; erection of a four/five/six/seven storey building fronting 
Campbell Road and a three/ four/five/six storey building fronting Broad Green Avenue, providing a 
total of 36 studio flats, 109 one bedroom flats, 138 two bedroom flats and 36 three bedroom flats; 
alterations to vehicular accesses and provision of basement parking” (Croydon 2006). Of this 37.5% 
of the units were proposed as affordable units in the application; 78% social housing and 22% 
intermediate. Again, the church in the left-hand image of Figure six indicates the earlier scale of 
building in the area as do the semi-detached inter-war housing to the back and back-right of the 
right-hand image.  
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4.4 Newham  
The third study is from an inner London borough, Newham, to the east of central London. Based 
around the historic settlements of East Ham and West Ham the borough is in East London which is, 
overall, the poorer part of the capital. Newham lost population between 1931 and 1981 but has 
been growing its population since. Newham was one of six host boroughs for the 2012 London 
Olympics and it encompasses the main stadium and other key facilities. In recent years the borough 
has seen major investment in transport with Stratford forming one of London’s major transport 
hubs. Linked to these factors, the area in which our case study sits has seen dramatic transformation 
over recent years.  
The case study development was built along the Stratford High Street and was completed in 2008 
and is built to a density of 513u/ha. The development is bordered to the northwest by the Bow Back 
River and to the southeast by the A11 road and its flyover. With the exception of an adjacent office 
building that was converted to residential large infrastructure and industrial buildings dominate the 
site. The site had a PTAL score of 4 and was sited within and area considered ‘Central’ in setting. This 
implies that an appropriate density would be between 650-1100 hr/ha. However the final scheme 
was proposed for a density that greatly exceeded this (1371 hr/ha). This was justified in the design 
and access statement (supplied as part of a planning application), by noting that the development 
would be fitting given the local context and met with the “…Council’s priority for development”. The 
final development, as per the planning permission comprises of, “…a mixed use scheme [of] 301 
residential units [with] 122 affordable, 654m2 of commercial space together with associated car 
parking and amenity space including new river access & public realm” (Newham 2005).  
Figure seven shows the block from the main road (left-hand image) and to the rear (right-hand 
image) leading down to the New River waterway that the blue tower overlooks. 
PLACE FIGURE SEVEN AROUND HERE 
 
4.5 Tower Hamlets 
The London Borough of Tower Hamlets is an inner London Borough to the east of London. Between 
1901 and 2001 is saw a steady and strong loss of population to about a third of its 1901 peak, it has 
gained population since 2001. These losses reflect among other factors, a long term drift to suburbs, 
extensive bomb damage during the Second World War and policies of dispersal to new towns. The 
slow decline and eventual total closure of the docks saw a loss of employment and population, the 
borough now includes the Docklands development, effectively a second banking and finance core 
alongside the City of London.  
The case study development (Figure eight) was completed in 2010 and is built to a density of 
926u/ha – much higher than the London Plan density range. It is located in the Isle of Dogs near to 
the high-rise Canary Wharf cluster that is a major centre, and was built on a site of unused light 
industrial units that was 3-4 stories high. It is well connected served with DLR, tube and bus routes. It 
comprises, “[The] construction of one building of 44 storeys, one building of 30 storeys and two 
buildings of eight storeys to provide 802 dwellings, and a total of 3,267m2 of retail (A1, A2, A3), 
Office (B1) and Community Uses (D1) at lower ground, ground and level 15,833 plant, public spaces 
and parking” (Tower Hamlets 2006). Tower Hamlets, Newham and Barking and Dagenham are all 
part of the Thames Gateway project, mentioned previously, and so all three are areas in which a 
high level of new development has taken, and will likely be taking place.  
 
PLACE FIGURE EIGHT ABOUT HERE 
 
5. Delivering density 
We turn in this section to look at the extent to which planners move beyond simplistic conviction 
claims and recognise and seek to balance the benefits with the dis-benefits of density, in other 
words, do they attempt to address the issues raised by discourses of pragmatism, and if so, how? 
We structure this section around four observations that are all, in various ways, linked to the 
hierarchical setting in which density is delivered.  
• Planners are inheritors of conviction claims.  
• They are at the interface between conviction and pragmatist discourses. 
o This produce great complexity for planners; this appears to be managed by recourse 
to the security of tried and tested procedures. 
• There was evidence in practice of seeking to balance the benefits and costs of density and of 
considerable reflection. How/whether this local learning is transmitted is unclear. 
 
5.1 Local planning and the three discourses. 
First, and as we might have expected, local planners did not appear to engage with the discourse of 
suspicion. At its extreme the discourse is philosophically anti-state planning and so we might 
reasonably expect someone whose chosen career is in state planning to have discounted this aspect 
of the discourse of suspicion. However, the discourse also includes those who see a role for planning 
but one that is more sensitive to the market. Although this element of the discourse is at least open 
to state planning in principle, it raises questions about the role and extent of planning that cannot 
easily be answered at the local level. Local planners are required to write plans and determine 
applications within the requirements of national policy and planning law. If they, or local members, 
seek to challenge the premise of higher tier plans (including assumptions about the degree of 
intervention in the market), this is likely to bring the planner into difficult confrontations (Mace 
2013). This is one reason why there was no evidence of any fundamental questioning of density 
policy along the lines suggested by the discourse of suspicion. Even where there might be sympathy 
with discourses of suspicion, individuals would also be well aware that these would only take place 
over a long timescale and they are engaged with more immediate day-to-day demands. The planners 
interviewed reflected the context in which they worked. In a London setting several referred to the 
usefulness of density in delivering a greater quantity of housing, on a limited supply of land, a 
proportion of which would affordable and so further social policy aims. Though we did not directly 
ask our interviewees to challenge the premise behind urban containment and density, it was notable 
that none sought to counter the overall context of the London Plan policy (one accepting of 
containment and the greenbelt). This is exemplified through the need to maximise the use of 
available land in their respective boroughs which was described in terms of the earlier policy 
requirements: to accommodate London’s growing population within its own borders and to 
maximise the use of brownfield sites. These were viewed simply as givens, acquired from higher tier 
plans and therefore immutable.  In this sense, the need for higher density was seen as a simple 
necessity arising from limited land availability in London and borough housing targets.  
[higher density is] making best use of our precious brownfield land because if you're not 
optimising the use of your brownfield land sites, that puts more pressure on your greenfield 
land sites and your open space. So I think that's the other benefit, it helps, you know, it helps 
protect valuable green space in the borough as well.  
Barking & Dagenham planning officer 1. 
 
The NPPF [National Planning Policy framework] obviously prioritises the reuse of previously 
developed land, which means that development requirements of whatever land use are 
sequentially aimed at the urban area, which obviously has an impact on the density of 
development to be accommodated in already a defined urban area.  
Croydon planning officer 1. 
 
What we have in London is a situation where with the adoption of the original London Plan, 
there was a decision made to accommodate London’s growth within its boundaries. The only 
way you can realistically do that is to boost density and obviously there are arguments around 
sustainability, there arguments around reuse of brownfield land, protecting green land. It’s… I 
think it’s viewed as a way of using land in the most efficient way possible.  
Newham planning officer 1. 
Barking & Dagenham planning officer one’s observation is perfectly reasonable within the 
framework of existing policy but does not question if the framework is in any way flawed or if 
alternatives might be developed. This reflects the hierarchical nature of the planning system with 
local planners being responsible for delivering housing locally within the framework set by national 
and regional policy. Whether our interviewees harboured suspicion of policy or not, they described 
how they were delivering policy set at a higher level and which they had no alternative but to adhere 
to.  
Given that London’s boroughs guard their territory jealously and have historically had a tense and 
testy relationship with London wide authorities (Travers 2004), this may be surprising. The London 
Plan, produced by the Mayor, forms part of each local borough’s development plan. This was a 
significant change initiated in 2004, giving the Mayor legal leverage over the In the early days of the 
new system attempts by boroughs to test the extent to which local plans could seek to moderate the 
London Plan saw the statutory process back the Mayor against the claims of local political interests 
(Mace 2013). Our interviewees referred to the authority of the London Plan on numerous occasions, 
but there was no evidence of any antipathy between the local and regional planners; rather the 
approach was one of acceptance and/or common purpose. 
What we have in London is a situation where with the adoption of the original London Plan, 
there was a decision made to accommodate London’s growth within its boundaries. The only 
way you can realistically do that is to boost density and obviously there are arguments around 
sustainability  
  Newham planning officer 1. 
 
As we saw in the literature review, Downs (2005) argued that sustainability policies might increase 
conflict between tiers of government as they tended to require the taking of policy decisions from 
the local to the regional or national level. This was not evident through our case studies which might 
be partly explained by the fact that the hierarchical nature of the planning system both creates the 
potential for, and helps resolve, conflict over claims and counter claims for density. While some local 
politicians and members of the public may seek to challenge some of the claims (causing a potential 
conflict for local planners), planners are able to fall back on the hierarchical-legal nature of the 
planning system in order to avoid the complexity of challenging inherited higher tier policy; put 
simply, they can warn local politicians (members) that any attempt to challenge fundamentally 
higher tier policy is most likely to end in failure. If nothing else, planners’ appreciation of the legal 
construction of the planning system is likely to make them support – or at least not bother to 
contest – ‘inherited’ policy on density and other matters. Where claims from the discourse of 
conviction are tiered down to them, planners are able to assert that these are a given too. The 
hierarchy of planning can create complexity as planners find themselves at the interface of 
conviction claims passed down from above and the realities of delivering on the ground. However, in 
practice, the hierarchy offers the potential to simplify as local planners can simply cast themselves as 
the deliverers of national and regional policy. And even though planners find themselves at the 
interface between conviction and pragmatism, this might not only be because they are between 
receiving conviction claims from above and the reality of delivering on the ground. Local planners 
may hold, or be owners of conviction claims just as much as they are receivers of them. 
Any reliance on the ‘authority’ of planning, of professional identification with conviction claims 
might be expected to bring planners into conflict with locally elected officials who are answerable to 
their electorate. There was, however, little evidence of this in the course of the interviews. Some 
planners did engage on an individual/professional level with the claims for density that was seen to 
set them apart from locally elected members (local politicians):  
…a lot of [planners] would have strong views around sustainable development and would see 
high density as being a useful tool in trying to encourage sustainable development. I don’t 
think local members hold those views at all actually. Their concerns would be that too dense a 
development might lead to potential social problems that not enough car parking is provided 
for those developments… 
  Barking & Dagenham planning officer 2. 
 
We might expect a professional cadre of planners delivering national and regional policy to have 
consistently to confront the more conservative views of local politicians and the public. Our survey 
respondents lent only weak support to this view. When asked if higher density development is more 
popular with planners than local members nine of 17 agreed/strongly agreed, six were neutral and 
only two disagreed. Neither did the interviews suggest a set of planners inculcated into a 
sustainability (including density) discourse that was consistently at odds with those of elected 
officials. There was no such clear division with members sometimes described as pro-density, 
typically because of the potential to develop much needed housing in London. However, member 
support was highly contextual, even within boroughs, depending on individual visions of how 
boroughs should develop. This is well illustrated by the case of Croydon where members 
representing the core ‘edge city’ clearly had different views of appropriate development from those 
elsewhere in the borough. 
I’d say local members are elected so they’re keen to please their electorate. I’d say views on 
this vary considerably throughout the borough in terms of the outlying wards and the central 
wards. The councillors within the central wards are, you know, very positive about high density 
development generally when it’s got officer support that it’s met all the other criteria.  
Croydon planning officer 1. 
Across the four boroughs officers described differing levels of support for schemes sometimes 
strongly supported by members at other times resisted. Several officers noted an emerging caution 
about new schemes as the pre 2008 development boom was seen to have led to a number of 
schemes of questionable quality with members becoming sensitive about the political fallout (see a 
London example from Mace 2013). Where opposition was encountered from local members, the 
planners we interviewed were clear that they were part of a broader national and, in particular, 
regional discourse that required higher density development; that is, they resorted to the defence of 
the planning hierarchy. However, it does not follow that the interviewees were zealots wedded to all 
the conviction claims for density as we will see in section six. 
5.2 Coping with the complexity of density 
The survey data suggests that the senior officers who responded are confident that they are 
aware of the trade-offs in delivering higher density development – that they are successfully 
managing complexity; 13 of the 17 agreed/strongly agreed that their authority was sufficiently 
aware of the dis-benefits that higher density development can produce and 11 of 17 
agreed/strongly agreed that their authority was effective in mitigating he dis-benefits of higher 
density development. In the survey officers were asked which influences were most important in 
delivering a balance of social and economic priorities. Once again local politicians were seen as 
playing an important and positive role (17 out of 17 important/very important in balancing social 
priorities and 16 out of 17 for balancing the environmental). In both cases both the London Plan 
and local plans were viewed as key (16 out of 17 answering being important/very important in 
both cases). National and regional planning policy provides a secure hierarchy which serves to 
legitimate density claims. Moreover, these are combined with local planning policy and process 
to provide a settling or stabilising of the everyday complexity that balancing the advantages and 
disadvantages of higher density brings. In the interviews, several officers described a process of 
policy making and testing which provided a clear foundation for the determining of planning 
applications. In three of our case studies at least one respondent, described how the assumed 
robustness of the policy development process resulted in local policy that was a fixed element 
that would be applied in a predictable and regular way in order to achieve appropriate decisions 
at the development management stage. The process described appeared logical, reasonable and 
straightforward. Given the substantial complexity involved and the competing pressures bearing 
down on officers it is understandable why they may view the process in this way as it provides a 
persuasive sense of surety and manageability. Officers were asked about how officers balanced 
the economic, social and environmental gains and losses of higher density development. 
Specifically they were asked about the relationship between policy documents and judgements 
made during plan determination. Officers referred back to the robustness of the policy making 
process rather than acknowledging that policy might leave these questions unanswered.  
Yes, I think that is done when you're preparing your local development framework. I think 
that's when you would do that. I mean all plans have to--, you have to do a sustainability 
appraisal of all your policy documents and of course the purpose of a sustainability appraisal is 
to ensure that you do get the right balance between those three different areas, the 
economics, the social aspects and the environmental aspects. So really that should be done in 
the sustainability appraisal of the local development framework. And really I don't think when 
we get planning applications in, we really think about planning applications in those terms 
because we're assessing them against policies, which should already have been assessed in 
that way.  
Barking & Dagenham planning officer 1. 
Barking & Dagenham planning officer 1 refers to a Sustainability Appraisal which would have been 
used to evaluate the impacts of the local planning documents. This was mentioned by officers in 
other locations too and, again, appeared to provide certainty that the policies would be robust in 
terms of their sustainability and so would lead to sustainable outcomes on the ground; i.e. should 
not be unduly detrimental to any one of the strands of sustainability - economic, social or 
environmental.  However, in the UK there is considerable discretion exercised at the plan 
determination stage and it was not clear how the faith placed in well formulated policy would be 
applied to the reality of determination where a process of negotiation can frequently lead to some 
policies being given more weight than others.  
 
This point is reinforced by experience of the London Plan Density Matrix (reproduced at Figure four), 
which was identified as a key tool in terms of setting objective, appropriate, and easily measurable, 
parameters for delivering higher density development. Despite the faith placed in the Density Matrix 
by local planners, as giving a firm reference point in a fluid and complex environment, its limitations 
have been recognised from early on. While it was referred to as an important tool in the process on 
a number of occasions as we have seen, its parameters are frequently exceeded. Officers therefore 
appear to rely on securing the balance of advantage and disadvantage by applying robust and tested 
policies yet, in practice, these policies are often, themselves, weighed one against another (Bowie 
2008). A GLA commissioned review (URS/Patel Taylor 2006), which studied the application of the 
matrix in four London boroughs (including Tower Hamlets and Newham), found that even though, 
“[the] Boroughs have taken the Density Matrix as a strategic planning policy and have applied and 
adopted it to local circumstances” (p19), the implementation was often very flexible and ambiguous. 
The report notes that for example, “setting… is not often referred to explicitly and ….not 
geographically defined or mapped; PTAL is refereed to but…not often mapped” (p20) and that the 
other criteria such as car parking and housing type are not referred to in practice. Therefore, 
planners both turn to the Matrix for certainty yet apply it in an unclear and sometimes inconsistent 
manner. 
 
Recognising the crudeness of the Density Matrix as a tool, a 2012 study (Maccreanor Lavington et al. 
2012) proposed ‘optimizing’ density based on a wide range of factors that focused on the quality of 
the development rather than ‘maximizing’ density and proposes various design and management 
mechanisms to ‘fit’ higher density developments into different contexts. Following this, the GLA’s 
2012 London Housing Supplementary Planning Guidance (SPG) notes that there has been a 
disjuncture between the policy objectives of the matrix and its implementation at borough level, 
which resulted in a lack of consideration of local characteristics and inadequate attention being paid 
to many policy objectives. The SPG notes that among a variety of factors, attaching undue weight to 
the Density Matrix has resulted in some unfavourable results and therefore argued that density 
should be understood as an outcome of a variety of measures, “rather than a concern in its own 
right” (GLA 2012: p30). Therefore, the SPG states, “That is not to say that density in its own right is 
no longer a Mayoral concern- it is, but only one among a much wider range of amenity, transport 
and social policies to manage development in ways to secure sufficient numbers and types of home 
in a high quality environment while respecting local character.” (GLA 2012: p30, emphasis added). 
Thus, even though the latest iteration of the London Plan retains the Density Matrix, it proposes that 
it should be used as only one among many policy objectives to optimise development on sites in 
different settings.  
 
Local officers would already be well aware of the broader conviction claims for density like social 
mixing, reduced car ownership, proximity to work etc. The ‘over-application’ or excessive focus on 
the Density Matrix seems to reflect that, for the local planners we interviewed, it represented a fixed 
point of reference among the complexity of claims for density. In the context of New Public 
Management where great stress was laid on targets and measured outcomes the Matrix dominated 
because it provided a set of easily applied figures (although often exceeded). Only in one of the four 
cases did an officer strongly recognise the complex act of coordination required to maximise the 
benefits and minimise the dis-benefits of density. S/he talked at length about the need to focus less 
on density and particular outcomes and more on coordinating different service providers to 
establish at the policy formulation stage the wider policy goals, as density, as a means of goal 
delivery, carried with it both positive and negative attributes. S/he also discussed the iterative 
nature of the relationship between policy and the development management process. The latter 
was not simply a case of applying policy but rather there was a need in higher density applications 
for development management officers to work with policy and other service providers to achieve an 
understanding of the challenges and potential of a proposed development and then to seek to 
maximise the potential wins and minimise losses. More typical was for the interviewees to describe 
the balancing of advantages and disadvantages not as a ‘live’ process actively re-negotiated as part 
of each application but as a settled and fixed outcome of earlier policy development. This was one of 
the few instances where the institutional complexity of the decision making process was 
acknowledged and the need to foster and maintain active relationships between the many agencies 
involved in local governance and service delivery was highlighted. 
 But those policies are only as good as the Development Management Officers who are 
implementing them. And the scale of development in Tower Hamlets is such that they need to 
be very, very good officers, they need to make those assessments, and we have urban design 
conservation specialists to assist. They need to be able to make those incredibly detailed 
assessments, whether you were looking at a 500 unit scheme, which is 50 storeys in height, 
there’s a lot of habitable rooms in a wider area, you need to be confident you’re not going to 
impact on their daylight and sunlight. So there’s a lot of detail to go through in rigour, you 
need to be strong in negotiation. A 50 storey tower may be wholly inappropriate on that other 
site but it could well be in a certain area a 20 storey tower may work. In other areas a 
relatively high density scheme could come in six, seven storeys, that might be over 
development on a particular site and so there’s a lot of skills and experience I think in making 
the quality context apply and be able to have the confidence and the strength to negotiate 
with the developer to get the best scheme through.  
Tower Hamlets planning officer 1. 
6. The outcomes 
While the survey data reported in 5.2 suggested that senior local planners were confident that they 
were aware of, and successful in, balancing the advantages and disadvantages of higher density, 
another question solicited a different response. The survey respondents were more neutral when 
asked if higher destiny development had improved the overall environment in their borough (three 
agreed/strongly agreed; 11 were neutral and three disagreed/strongly disagreed). The mismatch 
between claims for destiny and the outcomes were seen in a number of instances.   
6.1 Density as delivered 
We use Boyko & Cooper’s (2011) six categories of claims for higher density - mobility, efficient land-
use, social equity, economic benefits, aesthetic advantages and energy efficiency - in order to 
structure our discussion of how planners reflect on the relative success of each in practice. First 
mobility, after the need for more housing the next greatest driver of density for the survey 
respondents was the need to reduce car use (14 of 17 agreed this was important/ very important) 
and to increase use of public transport (15 out of 17). There was some evidence that this is not being 
delivered in practice. From the interviews there were twenty coded references to mobility with 
these being dominated by one of the outer London boroughs (Barking & Dagenham). Here the 
primary concern was with the increasing demands that a greater density of residents placed on 
parking spaces in the borough and on the need for improvements to the public transport system. 
This focus is unsurprising in outer London as people are likely to make diffuse inter-suburban 
journeys which are far harder to provide for by public transport than the more concentrated radial 
journeys that the ‘classic’ commuter might make into the city centre. London’s employment spaces 
have a polycentric nature to them, while the centre dominates; there are multiple sites of 
employment across the capital and neighbouring counties. However, few of these are large single 
centres such as Croydon, the pattern is better described as atomised as people move from suburb to 
suburb to access small to medium sized work locations. There is no evidence that the new higher 
density residential development in places such as Barking and Dagenham is providing local work for 
residents so reducing the need to travel. There is a car club in the borough (typically more common 
in inner London) but cars are at a distance from the town square development that we were looking 
at. There was also some evidence of coordination between service providers, again in Barking and 
Dagenham an officer referred to Barking Riverside where the permission for 10,800 new homes was 
capped to 3,500 with the rest being conditional on the delivery of an extension to the Docklands 
light rail system. Nevertheless, and as with other aspects of higher density schemes, there was a 
reported gap between what people were encouraged to do as part of higher density living and what 
they did do. Despite car clubs and public transport provision and the restriction of parking supply 
(both in terms of absolute spaces and through parking control zones), residents still bought and used 
cars and sought parking spaces.  
The only other thing I would say is that there is a whole issue about car parking in all this and 
how that fits in with some of this high density thing because it doesn’t--, just because you don’t 
provide the car spaces in developments doesn’t mean people don’t have a car so in that sense 
there’s something I think that we might well have thought a bit more about previously.  
Barking & Dagenham planning officer 2.  
A second claim for the compact city is that it makes best use of resources including land, by 
curtailing greenfield development. Alongside policy linked to the efficient use of land, is the notion 
that compact development is efficient in terms of infrastructure provision. Higher density directs use 
to existing resources such as water and sewerage, existing public buildings and services and saves 
the need to provide this elsewhere. There was no mention of higher density increasing the efficient 
use of utilities infrastructure such as water and electricity. In part this may be because this argument 
is more pertinent at a regional or national scale where development outside existing built up areas 
would require extensive new provision. Moreover, in a London context, most of the infrastructure 
needed is largely already ‘in the ground’ and with provision made via the private sector, our 
planners may have been less likely to consider these benefits specifically. Finally, whilst water 
provision in London is problematic, its supply is again via private companies and its efficient use is 
mediated through building regulations, a system that sits outside planning in the UK. 
Where the link between density and resources did provoke a response was in relation to the 
requirement for further publicly supplied resources. This was especially emotive when school places 
were discussed. The provision of larger flats was seen as important for families with children, 
especially in areas with higher ethnic minority populations. However, these flats also implied the 
need for additional school places, which are currently undersupplied across London. In addition, our 
planners commented that there was often an unexpected occupation of one and two bedroom flats 
by families with children, which led to an even greater demand for school places than anticipated, 
leading us to reflect on the often unexpected ways in which people occupy and use property. As 
we’ve seen with the Barking and Dagenham case, planners can use Section 106 agreements to 
restrict new development until a service is in place (e.g. the extension of the Docklands light rail). 
This serves as leverage on regional and central government who clearly want to see housing 
delivered but may be slow at providing other infrastructure. However, school provision is calculated 
through a periodic review of actual school pupil rolls and is non anticipatory. Planners can seek 
Section 106 funding from developers to bridge the gap between new children moving onto 
developments and into local schools, but there is no guarantee of the number of pupils that a 
development will yield and, where families unexpectedly occupy small flats there can be a 
considerable under calculation. Here a developer would be unlikely to agree to a contribution when 
building one and two bed units. Therefore, for our cases, the limits of government funding and 
developer contributions both made higher density development appear as a short to mid-term drain 
on resources rather than a means to maximise it.  
Our experience is that large numbers of people bring children and then you get into that whole 
issue about well where’s the infrastructure for those children. So there’s a whole social 
infrastructure argument as well tied back into this and then that has to be balanced against 
those other things that I think we talked about in terms of the benefits.  
Barking & Dagenham planning officer 2. 
 
In addition, interviewees reported the challenge of achieving cooperation from other public bodies, 
(private bodies can also be very hard to work with but they were less likely to make demands on the 
authority at a later date for resources). These are often the result of common coordination problems 
or silo structures, where different service providers have separate lines of accountability, policy 
deliverables, and timetables and are often undergoing almost perennial reorganisation (a chronic 
problem for the health service in England).  
 […]we will consult [transport, health, education] and we’ll get nothing, we will meet and we’ll 
get no detail, or little detail. And then further down the line after the plans are set, “Oh, this is 
what we want and we want to do this,” and then we’ll have to react to it.  
Newham planning officer 1. 
 
And even where coordination between public providers has been has achieved the required 
outcomes may be resisted by the private sector as an additional cost: 
I still think we’re probably the first council in the country to allocate secondary schools on 
private development sites. […] as you can imagine the developers, at the examination in public, 
fought like anything not to have the allocations on their site.   
Tower Hamlets planning officer 1. 
 
The broad issue of supplying sufficient infrastructure in a timely manner was also picked up in our 
survey. When asked about the challenges arising from the delivery of higher destiny the most 
important was rated as insufficient social infrastructure (Doctors, school places etc.), 15 of 17 
responded that they agreed/strongly agreed and two were neutral; no-one disagreed.  
A third claim for higher density development, social equity and diversity, in effect, responds directly 
to England’s suburban tradition. Whereas the lower density suburbs were seen as driven by and 
leading to social division on a class and tenure basis, it was proposed that higher density and mixed 
tenure development could overcome this. Broader claims, based in Putnam’s (1995) concept of 
bridging social capital and the idea of ‘mixed communities’ posited that greater social interaction 
between individuals of varying social classes would in turn create more vibrant successful 
communities with lower levels of worklessness, poverty and social exclusion (See Lupton & Tunstall, 
2008 for a review). Many of these gains were to be made via the provision of affordable and market 
housing together in new developments where the mixing of tenures was to be encouraged. Whilst 
these claims have been extensively critiqued from a variety of perspectives (Cheshire, 2006; Lupton 
& Fuller, 2009), our purpose here is to merely report it as a claim for higher density and to reflect on 
the evidence gained in our case studies. Beyond one comment from a planning officer in Tower 
Hamlets who thought that the influx of new residents (especially homeowners) had been positive for 
the borough, there was little to suggest that social mixing was being achieved. In reality, our 
interviewees would have little or no way of knowing this as the day-to-day management of housing 
estates falls to building managers, concierges and Registered Social Landlords. The most common 
reference made by our planning officers to any social benefit, was that higher density allowed for a 
greater quantum of new housing and that this therefore met housing need.  
In the literature, a possible downside of higher density is a socio-psychological one; a lack of 
wellbeing because of some cultural/social disinclination for density and/or high-rise. Some of our 
interviewees did raise similar concerns although relatively few times (coded in 12 places). As one 
officer noted, the presence of density could be taken as the appearance of crowding. In one sense 
this could be an accurate perception as greater density may mean more people and so more 
competition for resources in the area – more people trying to access the local GP or dentist. 
However, one of the challenges of density is that we simply do not know, and cannot control, how 
units are occupied. As we have noted, planners reported being wrong-footed by families occupying 
smaller units. Equally, a higher density of units need not mean a higher density of population; lots of 
units occupied by single people may generate fewer people in an area than housing occupied by 
large numbers of people.  
It’s things like crowded, places being crowded, density can often be confused with things like 
over occupation ‘cause you can have things like high density but it may not be--, let’s say, the 
units might actually be quite spacious within that, it may not be crowded at all.  
Newham planning officer 1. 
 
Another psychological aspect was that of choice; as one interviewee noted a basic difference 
between private market and social tenants was that while private tenants were more likely choosing 
to live in higher density properties, social/affordable tenants were likely to have had less, if any, 
choice. Both the style of the housing and the nature of the area generated by the presence of higher 
density housing may have positive buy-in from some, representing more modern housing, a certain 
vibrancy and urban aesthetic. However, differences in social and cultural capital may mean that for 
some social housing tenants higher density, in particular high-rise may simply reference past failed 
social housing experiments that incorporated high-rise living and so the necessary compromises 
such as reduced parking may not be compensated for by positive associations with modern urban 
form.  
The fourth set of claims is economic. Insofar as new higher density development is able to widen 
social capital by drawing private market tenants into areas previously dominated by social housing it 
also has the potential to improve spending power in an area as the new groups are likely to have 
greater income. The economic benefits are the fourth claim for density. Economic benefits could 
also include a transfer of social capital and people becoming more work ready; these have already 
been considered. Our interviewees discussed economic benefits in terms of an increase in spending 
power in an area. Here there was only a muted belief that this was happening. In Newham the view 
was that it had a positive affect but one that was hard to measure, this was reflected in Tower 
Hamlets. In the suburban boroughs there seemed to be a degree of path dependency at play. 
Croydon officers were positive in their assessment of the impacts, but the new residents were 
moving into an edge city with a history of high levels of employment and a dense built form in the 
town centre. In this sense, new residents were acting as agents of regeneration bringing back lost 
vibrancy to a large employment and residential centre. Barking and Dagenham roots lie in a working 
class industrial past, unlike Croydon’s service centre economy. As a broadly poorer borough than 
Croydon it appears to have struggled to bring in residents with spending power to revitalise the local 
economy. Rather, the story here is one of poorer and relatively more affordable areas being more 
open to ethnic minority in-migration and/or economically marginal renters. 
Would bring in people with money in their pocket that they spend locally. What the reality of 
what happened was there’s a lot of buy to let in it so ironically then there’s a lot of people with 
not very much money.  
Barking & Dagenham planning officer 2. 
Another example of economic development was the seemingly ‘de rigueur’ requirement that 
developments contain commercial uses at ground floor level. These units were reported as often 
hard to let and far from enlivening the streetscape led to dead space at street level. In part, the 
interviewees felt that it was because of the difficulty of achieving a sufficient quantum of new 
people to support new retail – especially given changing shopping patterns.  
The fifth claim is one of aesthetics, as reported by Boyko & Cooper (2011), these are related to 
questions of urban design, that of the inclusion of green space and aesthetic benefits both in terms 
of how buildings and also the wider area is designed (physical advantages). We do not deal with 
these in detail here as there was limited reference to them; that higher density might deliver 
aesthetic qualities including to open space. Only in Barking and Dagenham did officers refer to 
‘biodiversity’ where they referred to gains delivered alongside the provision of new higher density 
housing. These included the planting of rare species trees, siting bat boxes on new buildings and also 
the provision of green roofs on buildings (where there are not accessible to residents they can 
provide a habitat for bugs). 
A sixth and final claim is for the energy advantages of higher density living. As noted already in 
relation to water usage, the environmental performance of buildings is mainly regulated by building 
regulation legislation, which operates separately from planning. However, planning can require 
performance standards in excess of building regulations where there is an evidence-based case to 
support the exception. Planners can add conditions to a permission requiring developers to monitor 
the performance of buildings, although this is the exception rather than the rule. However, in Tower 
Hamlets the planning officer indicated that the council is active in post permission evaluation. In 
terms of our own, albeit limited, evidence on building performance, we found that building 
managers made a number of negative observations about high profile green energy schemes in 
buildings, in particular combined heat and power systems and solar energy panels. It was evident 
that these were often failing and were either redundant early in the life of the building or required 
substantial payments from residents to repair or replace them. The problem, as reported, was that 
systems were either of poor quality or were inadequate for the task when installed.  
6.2 Reflecting on practice 
In this section we consider how planners reflect on the experience of having delivered higher density 
housing. A simple assumption would have been to expect planners to be ready adopters of 
discourses of conviction, engaging with these as part of their core professional identity as deliverers 
of a more sustainable future (Jepson, 2001, 2004). As we saw in section 6.1, planners appear more 
engaged with discourses of pragmatism rather than of those of conviction, but to the extent that this 
is the case how do they manage the expectations raised by discourses of conviction and how, as 
pragmatists, do they then learn from their day-to-day encounters with density? These questions are 
the focus of this final sub-section. Whatever their original intentions and motivations, the planners 
we interviewed were fairly sanguine in their assessment of the likely benefits of density when 
weighed against the various claimed benefits. They recognised that density was delivering housing 
numbers and that it appeared to be maximising the use of available land in their respective 
boroughs. But there was clearly a considerable gap between the claims for density and what 
planners felt was being delivered. 
One feature not yet mentioned, was the considerable influence of the market in pushing for higher 
densities in the run up to 2008 and the subsequent economic downturn, which has severely reduced 
rather than halted development in London. Economic drivers were noted in all four study-areas. The 
general signals regarding the acceptability of higher densities and the need to maximise housing 
numbers, plus an absence, until recently, of minimum space standards all combined to encourage 
developers to bid more for land in the belief that high returns would be possible through higher 
densities. In reflecting on what had been built, a number of the planners indicated that the market 
had probably pushed members and planners to approve development that now appeared less than 
optimal. In the survey, when asked what was driving higher density in their authority the greatest 
influence was seen as the development industry (17 of 17 agree/strongly agree); although closely 
followed by regional policy (16 of 17 agree/strongly agree). These are not necessarily so different, as 
the 2004 London Plan was argued by Thornley et al. (2005) to have been strongly influenced by 
private sector interests.  There was a strong sense that the planners we interviewed had been on a 
journey following the post-millennial policy turn that favoured higher density but which ran parallel 
with a burgeoning land and property market.  
But I think there was then too much focus on trying to cram as much development as possible 
on those brownfield sites. And I think since 2008, when we had the credit crunch; I think we've 
sort of backtracked from that virtually.  We've got examples now of sites in this borough were 
previously, you know, developers were trying to extract higher and higher densities  
Barking & Dagenham planning officer 1.  
The combination of a policy turn to higher density and an extended period of speculative 
development in London was commented on in all four local authorities and all thought that the 
private sector had been able to push densities to inappropriate levels and without providing wider 
gains in a ‘hot’ property market. However, more constrained times had provided space for reflecting 
and the view was also expressed that many lessons had been learned. 
I think the quality of homes has improved significantly. I think maybe in the mid 2000s, at the 
peak, I think there are arguably some schemes, which aren’t of the highest quality. Now the 
schemes that are completing are--, I think are absolutely fantastic, I could reel off ten names of 
schemes that have been put forward for housing design awards. I say ten names of schemes, 
ten high profile, big flagship schemes. But a lot of the smaller schemes are much higher quality 
than maybe they would have been ten, 20 years ago. So I think for design quality we’ve really 
upped our game. 
Tower Hamlets planning officer 1. 
 
Arguably, the ability of planners to reflect on the market push for density has a teleological quality to 
it, a belief that present knowledge and reflection will lead to better outcomes in the future. Planners 
were once only experienced only at delivering lower density housing, had made mistakes and learnt 
lessons with higher density and now had acquired the requisite knowledge. This might be tested 
when land and property markets pick up again and developers are once again incentivised to push to 
maximise rather than optimise density on any given plot. Notwithstanding this reservation, all of the 
interviewees demonstrated considerable reflexivity on what had been delivered in the boom period.  
A number of officers stressed that they were not focused on density as a discrete element when 
evaluating any particular scheme, as density was simply one element amongst many in need of 
consideration. If other factors (e.g massing, quality of internal space, access, external space, etc) 
were deemed not to have worked out, then this might indicate a problem with the density. 
However, other elements, especially those related to design were as likely to be the key criteria for 
judging success or failure. The focus on massing and design reflect ‘success criteria’ to which 
planners have ready access as it’s relatively easy to judge the physical appearance of a development 
once it’s been built. There was limited evidence of planners accessing the experience of either 
building managers is a valuable yet under-utilised resource. We acknowledge that this is not 
necessarily an easy resource to exploit as it can be time consuming and therefore costly to gather 
information and this evidence can be hard to interpret. The same is true of the residents’ experience 
of the building. However, emerging academic work focused on the residents’ experience, it raises 
pertinent and sometimes uncomfortable issues for professionals seeking to deliver a successful 
higher density environment. Dempsey (2012) indicates that residents’ assessment of success and 
failure might vary from that of the planners. She finds, for example, a negative correlation between 
density and sociability and a reduced sense of security. Similarly, Allen and Blandy (2004) suggest 
that for many, life in higher density accommodation may simply be seen as a temporary 
phenomenon linked to life-stage. There are indications that the demands of higher density living 
(sometimes being nearer to noisy uses such as bars, and a lack of car-parking spaces) may lead 
people to seek lower density living once they can afford to and especially when managing dual jobs 
and children make car use a greater priority in order to manage household time (Jarvis et al 2001). 
Such work, therefore, provides a micro-view on the specificities of a particular development only 
some of which will translate to more general lessons. 
 
Although our officer interviewees referred to individual experience and judgement calls 
supplementing formal policy, it was not clear how their assessments of improved practice might be 
tested, and if accurate, captured and communicated to others. Some referred to formal processes 
for capturing data about outputs. All authorities have to produce an annual monitoring report which 
sets out statistical data on housing delivery; number of units, proportion delivered on brownfield 
land and so forth. Some concern was expressed that the present coalition government was reducing 
the requirements of this and that the result might be less quantitative monitoring on the part of 
some authorities. Of course, the absence of government requirement need not prevent data 
gathering but it does make it a harder resource for planners to justify. Tower Hamlets reported a 
process that went beyond the statutory requirements and that also sought to capture qualitative 
elements in order to learn from what had been developed, but even this was design focused.  
…we look at something called the Building for Life Assessment and we go and review all of the 
buildings that have been completed within that year, and we use that as a basis to see how 
we’re doing and compare it year on, year on. [it’s] quite good because that is a more rigorous 
assessment of design quality and I think that’s a bit harder to pick up from statistics alone […] 
it’s a good tool for being able to get a more rounded view of the successful developments. 
Tower Hamlets planning officer 1. 
 
As we saw in section 5.2, the London Plan Density Matrix was viewed in technical reports as 
producing unintended consequences only two years after its introduction. While it had always been 
intended that it should be used as one tool alongside the many other policies in the original London 
Plan of 2004, it soon became evident that it was used too much in isolation from the other policies 
that sought to balance the gains and loses of density. While some may have interpreted this as a 
failure on the part of local planners, they themselves were aware of the limitations of density.  
 
…density I think is in many ways a blunt tool. It gives you broad guidance but the thing that 
matters most is the standards of accommodation and the design, the actual physical external 
appearance of the building and how it relates to its surroundings, its settings, surroundings.  
Newham planning officer 1. 
 
7. Conclusion – delivering quality in higher density development 
We are delivering higher density housing in the UK including a marked move from building houses to 
flats (especially in London). Our core interest has been how this has been managed, especially as 
some of the influential conviction claims suggest that density produces simple wins while the 
pragmatists point to considerably greater complexity. It is important to ask about the outcome of 
the planning of higher density housing because the built forms that people occupy might not tell us 
so much about the places they would chose to live in. Any reference to choice in housing must be 
tempered. What housing people chose to consume may only be a weak reflection of what they want 
to consume. As noted in relation to the suburbs in the US (Beauregard 2006) and the UK (Jackson 
1973), people moved to suburban areas because it simply made sense in economic terms. 
Oftentimes the economic logic was subsidised by state investment in, and spending on infrastructure 
and tax breaks that helped the suburbs to ‘stack up’ economically over the city. However, this does 
not mean that the suburbs were not popular (Clapson 2003). In a similar way, in the UK today, the 
turn to higher density living may reflect a preference for this new urban form and its concomitant 
advantages; but equally, it may be that people are living at higher density because they have no 
other choice within the constraints of budget and location.  
 
We have categorised the literature on density in order to reflect better the tendency to position 
taking on the issue. Discourses of conviction and of suspicion are informed by higher arguments 
about the relationship between the market and planning, to what extent should we intervene in 
markets or allow markets to determine the built environment. Clearly, these are passionate and 
recurrent questions and so the debate on density is ‘heated’ by these bigger questions. Although we 
have acknowledged these more fundamental questions we have focused on something rather 
different and more pragmatic; our work looks at the experience of delivering higher density housing. 
In many respects our approach is reflective of our third category of literature; we have sought a 
pragmatic understanding of, rather than a principled case for or against, higher density housing.  
 
Local planners are of particular interest because they stand at the interface between ‘high’ level 
conviction claims for density and the pragmatic realities of delivering schemes on the ground. Under 
New Labour the move to density was accompanied by conviction claims that density would deliver 
the triple bottom line of sustainability; that is, environmental, social and economic gains.  Alongside 
the triple win claims for sustainability more general and multiple changes in the institutional 
structure of local government produced enormous complexity for planners who had to coordinate 
government demands for a new planning culture, with a focus both on efficiency (meeting targets) 
and effectiveness (delivering an ever-widening set of outcomes including the win-win claims for 
density). Moreover, in London local planners, along with elected officials, had to work through an 
emerging relationship between the new Mayor of London and the London Plan and local plan 
making and determination. These changes were bedding down at the same time as a very hot 
property market in London made huge demands on planners. Part of the complexity that informed 
the case study schemes was, therefore, an intense speculative pressure on the part of the private 
sector alongside an emerging institutional environment.  
 
As a series of developments have now been built and occupied under these conditions we wanted to 
know how planners had managed this period of complexity. While London has been relatively less 
affected by the post 2007 crash than much of the country many higher destiny schemes in more 
peripheral parts of the Capital are on hold, providing a period of relative calm in which to reflect. 
Have the claims for density been delivered within or lost to this complexity. In practice we see that 
planners engage primarily with a few key benefits of density, in particular that it delivers more 
housing which in turn provides the social benefit of more social/affordable housing; they are more 
circumspect regarding the wider win-win claims of density. We could interpret this rather negatively 
for the profession, that in a hierarchical planning system, local planners simply had to make the most 
of the hand they were dealt. It might be that planners simply responded to measureable targets and 
focused on these because that was what mattered in terms of their own accountability. We did see 
that local planners sought in some cases to reduce the complexity of competing demands when 
determining applications by relying on the robustness of certain ‘givens’. Local planners considered 
The London Plan Density Matrix and local policies to be proven tools to assist in decision-making and 
therefore decisions taken based on these would be robust. Although, in reality, the matrix or a 
particular numerically based policy would only produce robust outcomes if weighed against the 
requirements of other policies that accompanied it.  
 
On a more positive note, there was ample evidence of local planners being highly engaged in an on-
going reflexive practice, both formally and informally, quantitatively and qualitatively. As well as a 
broader reflexivity on the quality of the built form planners also evidenced an awareness of how 
development was being occupied. For example, how families with children occupied housing 
developed for smaller households or how people sought to maintain car use in the new 
environment. Although planners may have been led by accounting, the number of units built, at 
what density on what proportion of brownfield land, they were also indicating an awareness of the 
experience of living in these new places. Density does not necessarily, of itself, produce optimal 
occupation; people live in over-crowded conditions unable to access or afford adequate space. 
People still want to drive, because as part of a household they have to manage complex lives in 
terms of the time-space demands of the city (Jarvis et al 2001). While we have focused on the 
complexity of the decision making environment that planners find themselves in, it would also be 
useful to engage further with the complexity of how people actually live in higher density 
developments. Together with residents and building managers, local planners represent an 
invaluable resource for appraising the outcome of density.  
 
The coalition government, in the cause of localism and challenging top down government, has 
removed the requirement on local authorities to produce annual reports on the outcomes of local 
planning. Even if we take the intentions at face value as positive, a key lesson from our research is 
that there is much valuable learning that could be achieved by capturing and feeding up the 
hierarchy the experience of delivering higher density development at the local level. Moreover, local 
politicians were generally regarded as positive force in seeking to optimise the outcomes of density; 
they too represent a potentially valuable pool of experience. It remains unclear how local experience 
and lessons might be transmitted in to future delivery as there are no fixed mechanisms for 
individual reflections and borough assessments to be fed back up and incorporated within the 
planning hierarchy; so allowing hierarchical conviction claims to go unchallenged. If we are to move 
towards optimising density, seeking to balance effectively the benefits and dis-benefits, we need to 
acknowledge further its limitations as well as its possibilities. One way of achieving this would be to 
develop a more robust, counter-hierarchic learning mechanism that gives far greater voice both to 
the consumers of higher density housing (both residents and building managers) and, also, to local 
planners and politicians engaged with the quotidian reality of determining planning applications for 
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Figure one: Population density per hectare of London Boroughs 2011 (blue bars/right axis) 
and 10 year minimum housing targets 2006-16 (red line/left axis. 







Figure two: Indicative location of the four case studies within Greater London. 















Figure three: Change in dwellings per hectare 1996-2011, four case-study areas and three 
representative districts (high-medium-low change) neighbouring London.  
Source: Live tables on land use change statistics. Organisation: Department for Communities 
and Local Government. Table P232: Land use change: density. 
[Online]https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-land-use-
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Figure four: Original London Plan Density Matrix, 2004, with case study developments 
overlaid. 


















Figure five: Barking Town Square development 
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Figure six:  Croydon development  
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Figure seven: Newham development. 






Figure eight: Tower Hamlets development 
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